作者：James Holmes ，China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 6 2011年4月8日
翻譯：刘怡 ，《现代舰船》2012年7月B刊
北京在其周边海域采取的是一种灵活机动、易于变化的战略，这一现象部分或可归因于中国缺乏一种可以将诸多国家力量工具与国家政策结合起来的海洋战略。解放军海军信息化专家委员会主任尹卓少将是此种（总体性）战略的主要倡导者，在2011年初，他已经注意到“中国没有国家层面的明确的海洋战略”。一些侧重经济领域的部门发展了自己的战略，并且“海军当然有自己的海洋战略思考，但是这些都是某部门行为，而不是国家行为”（参李颖：“要以百年眼光规划海洋战略”，《国际先驱导报》2011年1月3日——译者注）。借用美国军事术语来说，这种情况叫作stove-piping【注1】，也就是不同主体各自承担不同的职能、缺乏一个有力的效能整合机制，从而阻碍了统一政策的实施。我们当可依据这一理论来解释中国在处理海洋事务时表现出的显著矛盾性和多变特征。
海洋战略（Maritime strategy）不单是指海军战略（Naval Strategy）。它和一切对一国海洋事业负有责任的政府机关都息息相关。它不仅系于正规海军，也需要借助海岸警卫队、相关的执法部门以及海洋学研究机构等力量方可得到落实。就连美国也只是在2007年才公布了第一个真正意义上的海洋战略——它不仅包含与美国海军和海军陆战队相关的内容，也涉及到国土安全部下属的另一支武装力量：美国海岸警卫队。
简而言之，中国外交官们把自己的国家描绘成一个人畜无害的大国，指望其他国家依据这一标准、而不是中国既定的目标和意图来揣度北京众多海上行动的动机。到今天，这些国家对中国的保证已经越发持怀疑态度了。不过北京随时可能明示他们的真意。尹卓少将在2011年“两会”期间曾向媒体透露，中国海洋战略正抓紧制定，不久就将看到结果。倘真如此，则北京在周边海域和空域的不稳定行动或者也可归因于某些稳定的策略。中国正在借助由高级军官传达的政治指导和由外交官发出的言辞来校准本国的海上行动，对华盛顿和东京等地的旁观者来说，这意味着中国的行为将越来越处在可预见的范围内。
高涨的官僚政治
乔治•华盛顿大学政治学与国际事务教授沈大伟【注2】在2011年冬季号的《华盛顿季刊》上撰文，把2009-2010年间中国在言行上的矛盾之处大部分归因于该国日趋多元化的政治体系内部各方利益的冲突（参沈大伟：“应对一个矛盾的中国”，《华盛顿季刊》2011年冬季号——译者注）。他的观点对我们很有启发。过去两年里，中国人民解放军的行动依旧相对迟缓，而北京在黄海、东海以及南海的外交攻势却似乎极为灵巧。资深政治领袖们精心谋划着外交政策，与此同时解放军领导人依然汲汲于武装力量的现代化。然而，随着中国的军事和海军计划逐步成熟、并使解放军获得了在周边地区发挥更大影响力的可能性，中国的军事领导人或许也乐于在政治事务上拥有更多发言权。为声望起见，中国的官僚势力必须与军队里的政治领袖进行协商。
目前来看，新的利益已经把频频“放炮”、希望籍此引起高层领导人注意的众多杂乱声音联合起来了。官僚政治正处在极度活跃的状态。这种现象的终极产物——据推测可能是某种公开发布的海洋战略——又会是什么样的呢？解放军军事科学院一位敢于发声的研究人员罗援少将恳请国家领导人在周边海域建立五种“存在”，包括“行政存在、法律存在、军事存在、经济存在以及舆论存在”。以这位罗将军为例，他似乎就已经意识到了为了既定政治目标而把行政、法律、军事、经济、舆论等工具串联起来的必要性。
其他人的做法也是如此。尹卓少将最近的一些评论暗示了中国海洋战略可能的轮廓。他注意到冷战的结束从根本上解除了核战争的威胁，因而对中国的战略环境持乐观态度。核僵持一朝得以排除，北京自可从容地将注意力转向“包括台湾问题、钓鱼岛问题、南海问题在内的海洋安全问题”。尹卓批评了美国在公海制造紧张的举动，并宣称“美国因素”在过去一年里“的确是（中国海上问题的）一个重要外部因素”。另一方面，这位少将也认定萎靡的经济和全球其他地区的军事义务将掣肘华盛顿“重返亚洲”的步伐，在此情况下，“中国需要牢牢把握住战略机遇期”。此类言论很有可能就是北京的海洋战略的外延。
如果我们把尹卓的言论视为某种征兆，则北京必将积极行动起来、巩固其蓝图里在中国周边海域乃至其他地区的优越地位。事实上，尹将军就曾引人侧目地宣称中国对北冰洋颇有兴趣。这位少将把海洋战略划分为三个部分——海洋安全、海洋发展利益和应对周边海洋争端问题。在海洋安全这一子集内，“重大问题和核心利益”依然是“台湾问题”，因为“这是事关中国国家统一的关键问题”。海洋发展利益则是“确保航线安全和应对周边岛屿争端问题”。值得注意的是，尽管尹卓强调“我们不希望通过军事手段来解决岛屿争端问题”，海洋安全和海洋发展利益依然隐含有动用武力的可能性。
尚无迹象表明中国会在其海洋领土主张方面做出让步，或者无限期延缓这些问题的解决。在被问及北京是否愿意沿用“搁置争议，共同开发”的大原则来处理与日本、越南、菲律宾等国的争端时，尹卓表示：“‘搁置争议、共同开发’的前面还有‘主权属我’。”以钓鱼岛争端为例，此处就“没有谈判和妥协的余地”，因为东京在美国的支持下“采取了打破双方默契的、政治上的重大举措，挑战中国的权益”。当然，他补充说中国的确“不希望通过军事手段来解决岛屿争端问题，不希望破坏外部环境”。不过将军也没有明确排除当周边“海洋问题”难以妥善解决的情况下以武力进行尝试的可能。
塑造有利于中国的因素
北京将依据哪些原则来发现它前无古人的海洋战略呢？上文探讨过的中国人意图的各种征兆里有一个共同点，那就是他们有决心在公海实现本国的国家利益，同时避免可能引起（任何程度）损失的武装冲突。没人想要打一场海上战争，尤其是中国人。北京更加偏爱在战略环境中“塑造”或者创造有利条件、以便在不必诉诸武力的情况下实现重要目标，这是基于以下事实：武装冲突有风险，它可能无意义的浪费资源，甚至一场打赢了的战争也可能驱使失败者寻求报复——这或许会令胜利转瞬即逝。中国战略学巨著《孙子兵法》的作者孙武宣称，用兵“善之善者”乃是不战而屈人之兵。用五角大楼的说法讲，审慎的政治家在外交政策事业上会节制地运用经济和军事资源，他们采用“节制武力”（economy-of-force）的路线，将力量留待应对未来不可预见的应急情况。
然而，孙子也承认极少有人能取得不战而屈人之兵的胜利。因此在战时与平时进行军事准备的必要性有相似之处。如果说赢得一场战争的关键在于有效的战备，那么在和平时期的对抗中起决定性作用的因素便是（使对手能够）感知到的实力和技巧。中国领导人一方面灵活地运用外交言辞，另一方面以巧妙部署好的军事能力作为支撑，这样一来，敌对国家既不敢挑战北京的政策、也永远不敢主动对抗中国。实力上的明显差距会让挑战者知难而退，同时吓阻那些有可能受蛊惑参与“搭车”【注3】对抗中国的局外国家。言辞、实力与行动将令中国不战而胜。这当中的引导逻辑是：人人都爱胜利者，他们绝不会把赌注下在明显会失败的那一方。
因此，和平时期的冲突实际上是一种心理战。战略学者爱德华•勒特韦克（Edward Luttwak）认为，和平时期海上危机的结果取决于冲突双方现有武器装备进行兵棋推演的（假定）结果在利益相关方眼中的可信度。这就是为什么军事分析家对一国舰艇、飞机以及陆上武备的技术数据往往极为关注。他们是在尝试预见未来。要在和平时期的争端中胜出，首要问题在于使假想敌确信它在热战中毫无获利的希望。简而言之，大多数人认为哪一方可能在战时获胜，那么这一方在不诉诸武力的对抗中也往往能立于不败之地。
外交
外交、认知和军事能力之间无疑是存在关联的。接下来让我们审视一下中国的海事工具箱里有哪些可用的工具。外交在层次上显然高过罗援将军罗列的那五种存在。我们可以把“外交”粗略地定义为与外国政府进行谈判的艺术，它需要综合运用一切手段来支撑本国外交官在外国谈判对象面前言论的可信度。而这些手段综合运用的成效则取决于以下变量：战略环境，双方各自的政治目标在其整体战略中占多大重要性，双方预备为达成这些目标所耗费的资源总量，以及预备为达成此目标花费的时间。
外交乃是中国赖以塑造其周边海域战略环境的先导。北京的外交官们借用了孔子和明代大航海家郑和这些传奇人物的遗产，对周边亚洲国家大搞魅力攻势。我们不禁回想起在2008年北京奥运会开幕式上，中国年轻人也是高举这些先贤的画像列队前进，为全世界所注目。北京希望借此传达的信息显而易见：中国曾是一个航海事业相当发达的国家——并且与历史上那些热衷侵略的海上强国截然不同——它性质内敛、从不欺侮邻国；当中国重新崛起为世界强国之际，它也一定会效仿这一史例。北京将会——事实上也必须——成为亚洲海上安全一个值得信赖的守护者。
以上无疑是一个关于中国的动人故事。不过，既然北京把孔子与郑和当成外交门面，他们显然也给自己设置了一个相当严苛的标准。从历史角度看，中华文明毋庸置疑是一种令人尊敬的文明，但中华人民共和国依然只是一个相对较新的政权。假如它希望其他亚洲国家相信自己本质上是一个无害的大国的传说，就必须严格遵照孔子的教诲来行事。如果北京无法始终做到这一点、或者在一个较长时期内没能达到相应标准，就有可能使之前的外交姿态部分或全然沦为笑柄——这一点已经为最近的事态所证实（参霍尔姆斯：“中国是一个‘柔性’海上强国吗？”，《中国简报》第9卷第17期——译者注）。
海上力量
如果说外交手段乃是中国对外政策的先锋，那么长久以来北京也在致力于强化与外交相匹配的海上武力。中国军事作者们注意到了一项心理影响：训练有素、装备良好的军队往往对观察者产生一种压力。“如果可以把军事硬实力比作利剑”，马恒辉在《解放军报》撰文称，“软实力就是它的凛凛寒光、铮铮夜鸣”。军事软实力“由战略思维、决心意志、战斗精神等诸多非物质元素所构成”。衡量一支军队软实力的强弱不是单纯看其规模数量和武器装备水平，“而是看其构成要素的质量及其运用能力的高低……军事软实力……对敌则表现为威慑力、遏制力和瓦解力。”（参马恒辉：“我军应提升软实力把握战争主导权”，《解放军报》2010年11月25日）
上文所述显然不是诸如约瑟夫•奈这样的学者所诠释的“软实力”【注4】的本意。也就是说，它不是指那种基于优良文化、传统和制度，有助于一国领导人说服其他国家与之保持目标一致的“吸引力”。相反，马恒辉所说的“软实力”灌输的是关于成功武装部队的印象，它使其他国家确信这不是一支可以等闲视之的军队。通过建构这样一幅图景，解放军可以支持实行胁迫外交或威慑外交的潜在可能，增加北京在不真正付诸武力的情况下赢得争端的机率。一支富于军事软实力的解放军海军可以威慑规模较小的军队，助力北京不战而胜的机遇。
海洋事务的塑造并不完全局限于解放军海军。近期发生在马尼拉和北京之间的争端证明，诸如海监和渔政这样的非军事部门乃是海军力量价值重大的补充。除此以外，像解放军空军和第二炮兵——中国导弹部队——这样的陆基力量在海上外交中也扮演着一定角色。从陆上基地起飞的战斗机和海上巡逻机可以为活动于近海的解放军海军小型舰艇提供防御屏障，岸基反舰巡航导弹和备受关注的（潜在的）反舰弹道导弹（例如DF-21D）也能起到类似作用。
上述海上力量——不论其为海基抑或陆基——的联合行动将对其他国家的“违禁”活动构成一种潜在威慑。换言之，既然众所周知这些平台拥有在特定海区发动攻击的能力，那么其假想敌的行动必然不敢越过中方能接受的心理底线。这几个假想敌深知公然挑衅北京决心的后果将是致命的，或许便会据此收敛本方的行为。如果解放军发展出了和谐地使用其军事力量的技巧，炮与锚必将成为北京外交手腕的有力助手。
自坏战略环境？
过去十年里，中国在周边海域已经进行了一系列成效显著的外交活动，使用了所有可取的国家力量工具。外交是一种成本相对较低的手段。中国外交官们可以随心所欲地描述本国的主张和承诺，甚至不必在意中国是否已经积累起足够的物质力量来把这些承诺变为现实。紧接着外交的是经济手段，中国快速的经济增长为这种手段提供了保障。北京已经编织起一张包含本国在内的经济相互依赖网络，他们还将进一步宣称中国的和平崛起必然造福亚洲所有国家。最后一种手段则是军事力量，事实上这仍是一项正在进行中的事业。目前尚无法预见中国在未来将如何运用其军事力量，例如，我们无法预测北京是否会尝试在南海实现其“核心利益”。不过有一点是肯定的：如果中国领导人企图在某个单一区域获得无可匹敌的优势地位，则中国在该区域之外的利益就有可能面临重大风险（参霍尔姆斯、吉原俊井：“中国能在南海保卫‘核心利益’吗？”，《华盛顿季刊》2011年春季号——译者注）。
目前看来，北京极有可能误判了军事力量在一种系于国家实力所有源泉的海洋战略中应当发挥的作用。无论如何，武力威慑并不是微笑外交的可取伴奏。中国在过去两年里咄咄逼人的姿态已经使得它在此前更长时期内依靠灵活外交取得的成果付之东流了。事实上，北京过分强调武力的表态可能并不成熟。中国尚不具备依靠武力强制推行其意志的能力，而亚洲其他国家将以恢复和中国的海上交锋作为激烈的抵触回应。北京的冒险可能造成一个怀有敌意的制衡联盟。
虽然不能断言北京在疏离微笑外交近两年之后是否可以轻易重回故道，我们依然可以预见中国会做出其他成功的尝试。中国在过去曾长期扮演仁慈大国的角色，但这一形象在近两年为咄咄逼人的姿态所折损。北京企图按自己的目标塑造战略环境，结果却对本国不利，甚至反而使美日这样的竞争对手从中获益。中国领导人是否能彻底完成一种连贯的海洋战略，并据此规范和整合中国海上政策的无数执行者的行动？我们依旧翘首以待。
【注1】 Stove-piping本意是指烟囱，烟囱是一个孤立的垂直传导结构，缺乏平行沟通；引申义指情报仅在上下两部门间纵向传递，不考虑具体环境，并缺乏横向部门间的沟通和协调。造成烟囱效应的原因包括部门间竞争、系统文化以及安全（保密）要求等，此处指的是与海事相关的各部门基于本位主义制定单独的部门战略，在职权和效能上没有经过整合与协调。
【注2】 沈大伟（David Shambaugh）是美国学界公认的中国内政、外交事务和亚洲安全问题权威，先后供职于国务院和国家安全委员会，并作为访问学生在中国居留多年，现为乔治•华盛顿大学埃利奥特国际事务学院政治学与国际事务教授兼中国政策研究项目主任，同时也是布鲁金斯学会资深研究员、外交关系协会成员和国防部顾问。在奥巴马政府第一任期内，沈大伟一度是驻华大使的热门候选人之一。代表作有《美丽的帝国主义》、《中国的军事现代化》、《权力转换：中国和亚洲的新动力》、《中国共产党：收缩与调适》等。
【注3】 搭车（Bandwagon）是国际政治中一个常见术语，与之相对的概念是制衡（Balance）。国家在面对重大外部威胁时通常会采取两种策略：制衡，即与若干其他国家结盟以对抗最突出的威胁，冷战中后期的中美接近属于这一类型；搭车，即对主要威胁方妥协、并与威胁的来源结盟，充当小伙伴，冷战中前期的“芬兰化”现象属于这一类型。不过本文中的“搭车”含义略有不同，它指的是亚洲次等国家在美日韩集团意图制衡中国时采取加入美国一方的策略。
【注4】 软实力（Soft Power）亦译作“巧实力”，是哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院院长、曾任克林顿政府助理国防部长的约瑟夫•奈教授（Joseph Nye）在1990年首创的一个概念，并在2004年出版的《软实力：世界政治中的取胜之道》一书中得到系统阐述。按照奈的解释，一国可以借助多种方式来影响国际事务中其他主体的行为、以达到本方所希望的结果，其中依靠军事手段进行胁迫和依靠经济手段进行收买的能力为“硬实力”，依靠吸引、说服和其他非物质手段使其他主体主动追随本方、进而达成既定目标的能力为“软实力”。文化、政治价值观（包括意识形态）和外交政策（包括国际声望）等是软实力的主要实现形式。
笔谈中国海军战略问题之四
特约记者：刘怡
刘：尊敬的博士，时隔两个月，又可以继续我们例行的笔谈了。您当然会猜到，讨论的重点不光是抽象的“海洋战略”问题，前一段时间围绕黄岩岛问题发生在中国和菲律宾之间的争端就提供了一个现实的分析例证。
当然，首先还是说说“中国的海洋战略不单是海军战略”这篇文章吧。我对您的某项推论有一点小小的怀疑：按照您的看法，北京在2009-2010年趋于强硬的外交姿态部分是由于中国军事实力的上升，以及中国领导人默认了解放军要求在对外事务上发挥更大作用的主张。但照我看来，与其说从“微笑外交”到“炮舰外交”（姑且先用这个不甚确切的描述）的转变是一种政策调整，倒不如说还是一项前景未知的试验。
长期以来，中国宣称自己不会侵略其他国家，也不会“称霸”，但这种承诺仅仅适用于全球范围的权力结构，也只有美国和欧盟这样的全球性政治行为体有可能理解和回应中国的姿态。但像菲律宾、越南这样的“地区性”国家对更大范围内的表态和承诺兴趣寥寥，它们的出发点和利益视角是不同的。然而在相当长一段时间里——或许从1950年代一直到1990年代——中国并未完全理解这一点。大多数时候，北京总是希望实施一种对任何范围和任何对象都适用的“完美”外交政策，在方式方法上也比较僵化。您说的“微笑外交”就是一个例子，与其说这是一种智虑深远的政策设计，倒不是说是因循了一种笼统的“和平共处”主张，它对实施对象的个别特征考虑的不是很多。
现在，中国政府已经注意到了这个问题，并开始寻求改变。从全球范围说，北京依然希望继续扮演负责任的利益相关者角色，但在亚洲事务上他们也要求更大的影响力。为了实现这种影响力的投射，有必要使用一些和过去不同的手段，比如武力威慑。但尝试毕竟只是尝试，手段也只是手段，如果发现手段不能达到预期目的，它依然可能被替换。您对此的看法如何呢？
霍：您说的这个问题很复杂。我姑且这样理解：中国领导人依然会对（美国、欧盟这样的）外部大国和大国集团保持微笑，但某些时候也会对自己的邻国皱起眉头。我们把这种现象称为“双重外交”，它主要由两个因素决定，一是（地理上的）距离远近，另一个是力量大小。
站在任何一个国家的立场上，对周边邻近国家和万里之外的强国采取不同的对待态度都是很自然的，当周边国家和那个遥远的强国在力量上极为悬殊时尤其如此。就这个问题来说，今天的中国和一百年前的美国有许多相似之处。当时与美国接壤的陆上邻国相对衰弱，而那些在力量上处于同一等级的强国则远在大洋彼岸，这使得美国有可能对周边国家采取一种相对强硬的政策。我们也不时注意到这种做法的必要性。对任何一个国家来说，发生在卧榻之侧的问题总是比万里之外的问题具有更大重要性，我们也会集中更多政治、经济和军事资源来搞定周边地区的问题。
从权力政治角度说，最重要的策略在于当与本国处于同一力量级的大国有意介入邻国事务时，本国必须预先设置彼此都能接受的行事规则。一百年前的美国并未禁止欧洲国家参与美洲事务，它仅仅是不允许这些国家在美洲建立新的殖民地、或者设置一些可能在未来惹出麻烦的海军基地。准确地说，这并不是美国在对不列颠帝国或德意志第二帝国“微笑”示好，这是一种强国之间的彼此尊重。我们只在他们遵循我们所定的规则时才会微笑！
刘：不妨顺着您的这条思路继续往下说。您曾在不止一篇文章中提到中国在南海地区实施“亚洲门罗主义”的可能性，在我个人看来，这是一种冒险之举。就像路德维希•德约（Ludwig Dehio）在他那本著名的《不稳靠的平稳》中指出的一样，主导性海洋强国总是希望在（欧亚）大陆均势与世界均势之间扮演中介者角色。一旦在欧亚大陆上出现一个霸权国家，并且这个国家意图对海洋强国关闭其地区市场，海洋强国马上就会开始干涉，并组建制衡联盟来挫败这一企图。这也就是为什么拿破仑和希特勒的帝国不能长久维持下去。这一规律同样适用于亚洲，如果中国领导人从历史中汲取到了教益，他们在行事时必定是慎之又慎的。
不过亚洲的问题也有一些不同。这一地区的大多数国家（比如韩国、菲律宾甚至越南）在过去半个多世纪里都习惯于按照区域外大国——尤其是美国——制定的规则来行事。因此，如果中国希望在亚洲扮演一个更具重要性而又适度的角色，他们也会希望华盛顿在亚洲维持某种形式的存在，并协助缔造一个多边合作机制。您对此的意见如何？对黄岩岛问题，您也有什么新的补充见解吗？
霍：您提到了“亚洲门罗主义”的问题，在我看来，必须首先分析这是“哪种版本”的门罗主义。如果今天的中国希望扮演的是美国在前期门罗主义阶段（也就是说从1823年到美国内战结束）扮演的那种角色，则您的看法就是正确的：中国应当借助美国的力量来完成对亚洲区域政治的塑造，把美国隔绝在这一地区外是愚蠢的，并且这种企图将越发促使美国卷土重来。如果美国在19世纪绝大部分时间里企图把英帝国隔绝在美洲之外，那这种做法显然是很可悲的，因为我们并没有足够强的海军来贯彻自己的主张：看似“扬我国威”，实则弄巧成拙。事实上，在19世纪为门罗主义提供保障的根本就是英国皇家海军，这种保障给予了美国一个继续发展国力的战略休整期。而倘若华盛顿急于出头，势必引发伦敦的激烈反应，要知道当时的大不列颠仍是世界头号强国，它在美洲的利益依旧是借助武力来推行的。
但是，如果今天的中国想要扮演的是美国在20世纪之后的角色，那么情况就整个不同了。进入20世纪，美国已经足够强大，它可以确保对任何一个欧洲国家有意派往西半球的最大舰队都保持区域内的海军优势。这使得华盛顿在处理和邻国乃至欧洲强国的关系时都出现了明显变化。美国试验了许多指导方针，比如在1895年委内瑞拉危机宣称“美国的指令就是法律”，以及在西奥多•罗斯福总统任期内提出的“国际警察”口号。最后，华盛顿还宣布放弃门罗主义，转而采用某些更富合作性的主张，比如睦邻政策、西半球共同防御以及泛美主义。
因此，对您的这项看法，我只能给出一个含糊客套的回答：“看情况！”我们要看今日亚洲的权力结构到底是更接近1823年还是1895年的美洲。我们也要看北京是不是足够明智（华盛顿往往并非如此），能够认清今日对弱邻的所作所为在往后需要这些国家提供支持和善意时可能残留的影响。要知道，即使是被视为美国“后院”的拉丁美洲，也曾在1898-1934年的“香蕉战争”期间不客气地教训了美国。我怀疑如国北京和马尼拉之间不能达成一项令彼此都满意的协议，多年之后菲律宾人也可能在黄岩岛给贵国制造麻烦。
刘：感谢您在百忙之中与我本人以及《现代舰船》的读者进行讨论。期待这种富有冲击和挑战性的对话能继续下去。
霍：希望我的这些看法对您有帮助。我也很乐意继续我们的对话。
China’s Maritime Strategy Is More Than Naval Strategy
Publication: China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 6
April 8, 2011 01:48 PM Age: 2 yrs
By: James Holmes
The sporadic confrontations that punctuated the past two years in the China seas subsided for a time. Senior U.S. military officials depicted the lull as a temporary, tactical retreat from the assertive stance Beijing assumed on such controversies as conflicting maritime territorial claims, foreign naval operations, and military surveillance in the "near seas" [1]. A string of recent events bears out their assessment, suggesting both that Chinese leaders have not abandoned their ambitions in these waters and that these ambitions are apt to encounter pushback from fellow Asian sea powers. Furthermore, the uptick in maritime confrontations demonstrates that China’s "smile" diplomacy—a diplomatic campaign designed to portray China as an inherently beneficent great power—is on hold.
Beijing’s mercurial approach to strategy in nearby waters may be attributed in part to the fact that it lacks a maritime strategy yoking various implements of national power to national policy. Rear Adm. Yin Zhuo, chairman of the Expert Committee on Navy Informationalization and a leading advocate for such a strategy, notes that "China does not have a clearly defined ocean strategy at the national level." Some agencies focused on economic development have developed strategies, while "naturally the navy has its own ocean strategy considerations, but these are all actions by certain departments and not at the national level" [2]. To borrow U.S. military lingo, "stove-piping," or dispersing functions among disparate bodies without coordinating their efforts effectively, impedes uniform policy. This helps explain the apparent inconsistencies in China’s approach to maritime affairs.
Maritime strategy is more than naval strategy. It involves all government bodies with responsibilities in the oceanic domain. It encompasses not only the navy but the coast guard, law enforcement, oceanographic agencies, and the like. Taming disparate agencies can be a challenge for oceangoing states. Indeed, the United States issued its first truly maritime strategy—covering not only the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps but the U.S. Coast Guard, an arm of the Homeland Security Department—only in 2007.
By portraying China as an inoffensive great power, in short, diplomats have handed other governments a yardstick by which to measure Chinese actions at sea against stated Chinese purposes and intentions. These governments increasingly doubt Chinese assurances. But Beijing could clarify its message at any time Rear Adm. Yin has reported that Beijing is formulating a maritime strategy and will soon publish the results [3]. If so, Beijing’s erratic behavior in nearby seas and skies may resolve into something steadier. Aligning the conduct of the maritime services with political guidance handed down by senior officials—and with the words uttered by diplomats—would make Chinese behavior more predictable for outsiders in places like Washington and Tokyo.
Bureaucratic Politics on the Upswing
Writing in the Winter 2011 issue of Washington Quarterly, George Washington University professor David Shambaugh attributes the dissonance between Chinese words and deeds in large part to jostling among various interests within China’s increasingly pluralistic political system [4]. Shambaugh is onto something. In past years, while the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remained relatively backward, Chinese diplomacy toward the Yellow, East China, and South China seas appeared rather deft. Senior political leaders orchestrated foreign policy while the PLA leadership remained consumed with modernizing the armed forces. Yet, as China’s military and naval project starts to mature, allowing the PLA greater influence over the nation’s environs, military commanders probably enjoy more say in policy circles. Prestige confers bureaucratic clout with the military’s political superiors.
New interests, it seems, have joined the mix of voices clamoring for the attention of senior leaders. Bureaucratic politics is in full swing. What will the final product—presumably a maritime strategy published in the public domain—look like? Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan, an outspoken research fellow at the PLA Military Academy, implores China’s leadership to establish five "presences" in the near seas, including "public administration, laws and legislation, defense, public opinion, and economic affairs." Luo, for one, seems to understand the need to align these instruments toward stated political ends.
So do others. Recent remarks from Adm. Yin hint at the possible contours of a Chinese maritime strategy. Yin takes an upbeat view of China’s strategic environs, noting that the end of the Cold War essentially did away with the threat of a nuclear exchange. Once the nuclear impasse faded, Beijing was free to turn its attention to "ocean security problems such as Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands problems, and the South Sea problem." He faults the United States for tensions on the high seas, branding the "American factor" one of "the major factors for ocean problems" over the past year. On the other hand, the admiral contends that economic malaise and military commitments elsewhere will slow Washington’s "return to Asia." Given these dynamics, "China must seize this strategic opportunity while it is available" [5]. There could well be an edge to Beijing’s maritime strategy.
Indeed, if Yin’s words are any indication, Beijing will act energetically to consolidate what it sees as a favorable position in the China seas and beyond. Indeed, he raised eyebrows by proclaiming that China has an interest in the Arctic Sea [6]. The admiral divides maritime strategy into three components: "ocean security, ocean development interests, and how to deal with the problems of disputes in peripheral oceans." In the realm of ocean security, the "greatest problem and central interest" is "the Taiwan problem" because it is "related to the key question of the unification of China." Ocean development involves "ensuring the security of shipping lanes and peripheral island disputes." It is noteworthy that both ocean security and ocean development potentially involve the use of armed force, even though Yin insists that "we do not desire to resolve island disputes through military means" [7].
There is little sign China will back down on its maritime territorial claims or postpone settling them indefinitely. Asked about Beijing’s readiness to set disputes with rival claimants such as Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines aside for the sake of joint resource development, Yin observes that "‘table disputes and develop jointly’ is prefaced with ‘sovereignty is mine.’" In the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute in particular, "there is room for neither negotiations nor compromise" since Tokyo "violated an unwritten agreement" with U.S. connivance "and challenged China’s rights." As he notes, China does "not desire to resolve island disputes through military means nor we wish to disturb the external environment" [8]. Nor does he unequivocally rule out a trial of arms should "ocean problems" in the near seas prove intractable.
Shaping Matters in China’s Favor
On what principles will Beijing found its first-ever maritime strategy? The common denominator among the indicators of Beijing’s intent explored above is the resolve to achieve China’s interests on the high seas while avoiding armed conflict at—almost—all costs. No one wants a sea war, least of all China. Beijing’s preference for "shaping," or creating favorable conditions in the strategic surroundings so as to achieve important goals without resorting to force, stems from the fact that armed conflict is risky, can squander resources needlessly, while even victorious war can provoke the vanquished into seeking vengeance—perhaps undoing the victory. Sun Tzu, whose writings are a staple of Chinese strategic discourses, proclaims that the "acme of skill" is to win without fighting. In Pentagon parlance, prudent statesmen use economic and military resources sparingly in foreign-policy enterprises, taking an "economy-of-force" approach that husbands assets for future contingencies.
At the same time, Sun Tzu concedes that few attain such virtuosity. Hence the need for military preparedness in wartime and peacetime alike. If combat readiness is the key to prevailing in war, perceived capability and skill represents the critical determinant of peacetime encounters. By deploying military capability artfully to back up its words, the Chinese leadership can arrange matters so that rivals desist from challenging its policies or never oppose China in the first place. An obvious mismatch of power could dissuade adversaries and dishearten third parties that might be tempted to bandwagon against China. Words, capabilities, and deeds would let China win without fighting. The guiding logic is that people love a winner but will not place their bets on an obvious loser.
Thus, peacetime clashes are head games. Scholar Edward Luttwak maintains that the outcome of peacetime crises at sea depends on how important stakeholders think a hypothetical trial of arms would have turned out [9]. This is why military analysts pore over the technical specifications of ships, aircraft, and armaments. They are attempting to glimpse the future. Convincing a prospective foe that it would stand little chance in battle is central to prevailing in peacetime disputes. In short, whoever most people think would win in wartime generally does in encounters short of war.
Diplomacy
So there exists a nexus among diplomacy, perceptions, and military capability. Let’s survey some of the tools in China’s maritime toolkit. Diplomacy ranks over and above the other instruments Gen. Luo identifies. Diplomacy—defined roughly as the art of negotiating with foreign governments—makes use of all of these implements to bolster diplomats’ credibility vis-à-vis foreign interlocutors. The mix among these instruments depends on such variables as the strategic circumstances, the value each competitor attaches to its political aims, and thus the amount of resources it is prepared to expend on behalf of these aims and for how long.
Diplomacy was the advance guard of the Chinese effort to shape the maritime environment in the near seas. Chinese diplomats rallied such legendary figures as Confucius and the Ming Dynasty admiral Zheng He behind a charm offensive vis-à-vis fellow Asian powers. Think back to the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony, when Chinese youth paraded images of these forefathers for all to see. Beijing’s apparent messages were that China was once a strong, seafaring nation that—unlike predatory sea powers of the past—refrained from abusing its neighbors, and that it is destined to follow this pattern as it regains its station among the great powers. Beijing will—and indeed must—be a trustworthy keeper of Asian maritime security.
This represents an appealing story about China. Yet, by making Confucius and Zheng He its ambassadors, Beijing has also set an exacting standard for itself. While China is, without a doubt a venerable civilization, the People’s Republic of China remains a new regime. It must live up to the Confucian benchmark if fellow Asian states are to believe its tale of an intrinsically harmless great power. Failure to do so, consistently and over a long time, may partially or wholly discredit Beijing’s narrative—as recent events attest (See "Is China a "Soft" Naval Power?" China Brief, August 20, 2009).
Maritime Forces
If diplomacy has been the vanguard of Chinese foreign policy, Beijing has been industriously building up maritime forces to match. Chinese authors grasp the psychological impact that skillful, well-equipped forces make an impression on key audiences. "If military hard power is a sharp sword," proclaims Ma Henghui, writing in PLA Daily, "soft power is its awe-inspiring gleam and clang." Military soft power derives from "non-material elements such as strategic thinking, resolve, and combat spirit." Gauging it is not a simple matter of examining quantifiable factors like numbers and specifications of weaponry; "it involves a consideration of the quality of its key factors and the ability with which it can be utilized … Toward the enemy, it is expressed as the power to deter, contain, and collapse" [10].
This is not soft power as scholars such as Joseph Nye construe it. That is, it is not a "power of attraction" that emanates from appealing culture, traditions, and institutions, helping a country’s leadership persuade others to want what it wants. For Ma, by contrast, soft power imbues successful military forces, convincing others this is not a military to be trifled with. By projecting such an image, the PLA can bolster the potential of coercive or deterrent diplomacy, enhancing Beijing’s chances of prevailing without actually resorting to arms. A PLAN rich in military soft power could overawe lesser militaries, boosting China’s chances of bloodless victory.
Nor is maritime shaping confined entirely to the PLAN. As the latest run-in between Manila and Beijing testifies, nonmilitary services like coast guards and fisheries services represent an invaluable supplement to naval power. Moreover, land forces such as the PLA Air Force and the PLA Second Artillery Corps—the Chinese missile force—have their part to play in nautical diplomacy. Land-based tactical and maritime patrol aircraft provide a defensive shield over PLAN flotillas operating in the near seas, as do anti-ship cruise missiles and, potentially, the much-discussed anti-ship ballistic missile (i.e. DF-21D).
Acting jointly, these maritime capabilities—sea- and land-based—furnish a recessed deterrent against foreign actions China wishes to proscribe. That is, these platforms can deter from over the horizon because of their known capacity to strike within certain sea areas. Those being deterred understand that the consequences of defying Beijing’s will could be deadly and may modify their behavior accordingly. If the PLA develops the skill to operate these capabilities harmoniously, the gleam and clang will represent potent adjuncts to Beijing’s diplomacy.
Misshaping the Strategic Environment?
The Chinese has evidently mounted a sequential diplomatic campaign in the near seas over the past decade, adding each element of national power as it becomes available. Diplomacy is inexpensive. Chinese diplomats could tell their nation’s story how they wanted, even before China had amassed sufficient material power to put substance into their words. Economics came next, made possible by swift economic growth. By knitting itself into a tapestry of economic interdependence, Beijing furthered the narrative of China as a nation whose peaceful rise benefited all Asian states. Military power comes last, and indeed it remains an ongoing project. It is far from clear, for instance, that Beijing could enforce a "core interest" in the South China Sea. At the very least, Chinese leaders would incur grave risk to interests elsewhere should they seek unquestioned primacy in any one theater [11].
Beijing appears to have misjudged the part military power should play in a maritime strategy that taps all sources of national strength. The mailed fist is a poor accompaniment for smile diplomacy. China’s bellicosity over the past two years has squandered many of the gains it reaped from adroit diplomacy in previous years. Its overemphasis on military force may be premature in any event. China cannot yet impose its will by force, while Asian powers have pushed back hard amid the recurring maritime confrontations with China. Beijing risks uniting a hostile coalition.
While it is doubtful whether Beijing can easily return to smile diplomacy after departing from it, successful attempts remain to be seen. China’s track record as a benevolent power now includes repeated blemishes. Beijing may have shaped the strategic surroundings to its disadvantage, benefiting competitors such as the United States and Japan rather than its own interests. Whether the leadership will follow through with a coherent maritime strategy—and thereby impose discipline on the myriad executors of Chinese policy at sea—also remains to be seen.
Notes:
1. Author discussions with U.S. Navy officials, US Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii, February 14, 2011.
2. Li Ping, "Plan Maritime Strategy Looking 100 Years into the Future," Guoji Xianqu Daobao, January 3, 2011, OSC-CPP20110124671001.
3. Chia Lei and Ma Hao-liang, "‘Defense Presence’ Should Be Built Up to Protect Maritime Rights," Ta Kung Pao Online, March 4, 2011, OSC-CPP20110304787011.
4. David Shambaugh, "Coping with a Conflicted China," Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 7-28.
5. Li, "Plan Maritime Strategy Looking 100 Years into the Future."
6. Gordon G. Chang, "China’s Arctic Play," The Diplomat, March 9, 2010, the-diplomat.com/2010/03/09/china percentE2 percent80 percent99s-arctic-play/.
7. Li, "Plan Maritime Strategy Looking 100 Years into the Future."
8. Li, "Plan Maritime Strategy Looking 100 Years into the Future."
9. Edward Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974): 6-11, 39-40.
10. Ma Henghui, "If Military Hard Power Is a Sharp Sword, Soft Power Is Its Awe-Inspiring Gleam and Clang," Jiefangjun Bao Online, November 25, 2010, OSC-CPP20101125704006.
11. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, "Can China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South China Sea?" Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 (Spring 2011), forthcoming.
