作者约瑟夫·奈 2013年1月9日Project Syndicate
CAMBRIDGE – What will the world look like two decades from now? Obviously, nobody knows, but some things are more likely than others. Companies and governments have to make informed guesses, because some of their investments today will last longer than 20 years. In December, the United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) published its guess: Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds.
The NIC foresees a transformed world, in which “no country – whether the US, China, or any other large country – will be a hegemonic power.” This reflects four “megatrends”: individual empowerment and the growth of a global middle class; diffusion of power from states to informal networks and coalitions; demographic changes, owing to urbanization, migration, and aging; and increased demand for food, water, and energy.Each trend is changing the world and “largely reversing the historic rise of the West since 1750, restoring Asia’s weight in the global economy, and ushering in a new era of ‘democratization’ at the international and domestic level.” The US will remain “first among equals” in hard and soft power, but “the ‘unipolar moment’ is over.”
It is never safe, however, to project the future just by extrapolating current trends. Surprise is inevitable, so the NIC also identifies what it calls “game-changers,” or outcomes that could drive the major trends off course in surprising ways.
First among such sources of uncertainty is the global economy: will volatility and imbalances lead to collapse, or will greater multipolarity underpin greater resilience? Similarly, will governments and institutions be able to adapt fast enough to harness change, or will they be overwhelmed by it?
Moreover, while interstate conflict has been declining, intrastate conflict driven by youthful populations, identity politics, and scarce resources will continue to plague some regions like the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. And that leads to yet another potentially game-changing issue: whether regional instability remains contained or fuels global insecurity.
Then there is a set of questions concerning the impact of new technologies. Will they exacerbate conflict, or will they be developed and widely accessible in time to solve the problems caused by a growing population, rapid urbanization, and climate change?
The final game-changing issue is America’s future role. In the NIC’s view, the multi-faceted nature of US power suggests that even as China overtakes America economically – perhaps as early as the 2020’s – the US will most likely maintain global leadership alongside other great powers in 2030. “The potential for an overstretched US facing increased demands,” the NIC argues, “is greater than the risk of the US being replaced as the world’s preeminent political leader.”
Is this good or bad for the world? In the NIC’s view, “a collapse or sudden retreat of US power would most likely result in an extended period of global anarchy,” with “no stable international system and no leading power to replace the US.”
The NIC discussed earlier drafts of its report with intellectuals and officials in 20 countries, and reports that none of the world’s emerging powers has a revisionist view of international order along the lines of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union. But these countries’ relations with the US are ambiguous. They benefit from the US-led world order, but are often irritated by American slights and unilateralism. One attraction of a multipolar world is less US dominance; but the only thing worse than a US-supported international order would be no order at all.
The question of America’s role in helping to produce a more benign world in 2030 has important implications for President Barack Obama as he approaches his second term. The world faces a new set of transnational challenges, including climate change, transnational terrorism, cyber insecurity, and pandemics. All of these issues require cooperation to resolve.
Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy argues that the US must think of power as positive-sum, not just zero-sum. In other words, there may be times when a more powerful China is good for the US (and for the world). For example, the US should be eager to see China increase its ability to control its world-leading greenhouse-gas emissions.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has referred to the Obama administration’s foreign policy as being based on “smart power,” which combines hard and soft power resources, and she argues that we should not talk about “multipolarity,” but about “multi-partnerships.” Likewise, the NIC report suggests that Americans must learn better how to exercise power with as well as over other states.
To be sure, on issues arising from interstate military relations, understanding how to form alliances and balance power will remain crucial. But the best military arrangements will do little to solve many of the world’s new transnational problems, which jeopardize the security of millions of people at least as much as traditional military threats do. Leadership on such issues will require cooperation, institutions, and the creation of public goods from which all can benefit and none can be excluded.
The NIC report rightly concludes that there is no predetermined answer to what the world will look like in 2030. Whether the future holds benign or malign scenarios depends in part on the policies that we adopt today.
约瑟夫·奈：2030年的世界
20年后世界将会怎样？显然这个问题没有人能回答，但发生某些情况的概率较高。企业和政府必须根据现有情况作出猜测，因为今天的某些投资将会延续到20年以后。12月，美国国家情报委员会（NIC）发表了题为《全球趋势2030：另类世界》的预测报告。
国家情报委员会预测未来世界将脱胎换骨，“无论美、中还是其他大国，任何国家都不能再成为霸权力量。”这是以下四大“趋势”的体现：个人授权和全球中产阶级成长；国家权力分散到非正式的网络和联盟；城市化、移民和老龄化造成的人口结构变化；以及日益增长的粮食、水及能源需求。
各项趋势都在改变世界，并“在很大程度上逆转1750年以来西方的历史性崛起，恢复亚洲在全球经济中所占的地位，并在国际和国内迎来‘民主化’的新时代。”美国仍将在硬实力和软实力两方面首当其冲，但是“‘单极时代’已经不复存在。”
但凭借当今趋势预测未来从来都谈不上准确。出人意料的情况不可避免，因此国家情报委员会还指出了所谓的“意外因素”，也就是能以出人意料的方式导致主流趋势偏离的结果。
全球经济是首当其冲的不确定因素：经济波动和失衡能否导致崩溃，多极化能否加强经济的弹性？同样，政府和机构能否迅速适应变化并为我所用，还是会被淹没在应接不暇的变化之中？
此外，尽管国与国间的冲突日益减少，但青年民众、身份政治和稀缺资源所导致的国内矛盾却将持续困扰中东、南亚和非洲。这将继而引发有可能改变全局的另一个因素：能否抑制地区动荡，还是为全球局势火上浇油。
此外还有与新技术影响有关的一系列问题。它们是会加剧冲突，还是能及时完成研究和推广以解决人口增长、快速城市化和气候变化所导致的问题？
美国未来扮演的角色是最后一个能改变全局的因素。在国家情报委员会看来，美国实力的多面性表明即使中国最早于2020年代在经济上超过美国，也很可能无法撼动2030年美国和其他大国同处全球领导地位。国家情报委员会指出，“美国在日益增长的要求面前过度扩张的潜在风险远大于其世界杰出政治领袖地位旁落的可能性。”
这对世界各国来讲是福是祸？在国家情报委员会看来，“美国力量的崩溃或突然撤出极有可能导致全球陷入长时间的无政府状态，”，“美国稳定和领导国际体系的作用无可取代。”
国家情报委员会同20个国家的知识分子和官员探讨了这份报告的早期版本，称世界上没有哪个新兴国像纳粹德国、日本帝国或苏联那样修正主义地看待国际秩序。但这些国家与美国的关系却非常暧昧。他们受惠于美国领导的世界秩序，但同时对美国的傲慢无礼和单边主义颇有微词。多极化世界的优点之一是美国的主导地位有所削弱，但唯一逊于美国所主导国际秩序的是根本没有国际秩序。
到2030年美国在创造良性世界中所起的作用对奥巴马总统的第二任任期具有重要的意义。世界正面对着气候变化、跨国恐怖主义、网络风险和流行病等一系列新的跨国挑战。所有这些问题都需要合作才能解决。
奥巴马2010年国家安全战略指出美国应当将实力视为正和而非零和。换句话讲，中国强大有时可能对美国（和世界）都有好处。比如，美国应当乐于见到中国对其领先世界的温室气体排放加强控制。
美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿曾经谈到综合硬实力和软实力的“巧实力”才是奥巴马政府外交政策的基础，并提出我们应当重视“多边伙伴关系”，而不是“多极化”。同样，国家情报委员会的报告表明美国人必须更好地学会如何针对他国并与他国一道行使权力。
可以肯定，在国与国军事关系所引发的问题上，了解如何结成联盟并平衡力量意义事关重大。但最精心的军事安排恐怕也对解决世界全新跨国问题无能为力，而这些问题给成百上千万人带来的安全威胁丝毫不亚于传统的军事事务。解决这些问题需要合作、体制，还需要能让所有人受益的公共利益得到弘扬。
国家情报委员会报告就此顺理成章得出结论，2030年的世界局势如何并不存在既定的答案。未来是美好还是黯淡将部分取决于我们今天所实行的政策。
翻译：Xu Binbin
