作者：沃勒斯坦（Immanuel Wallerstein） 2002年7月1日 The Foreign Policy
INTRO TO HEGEMONY
The rise of the United States to global hegemony was a long process that began in earnest with the world recession of 1873. At that time, the United States and Germany began to acquire an increasing share of global markets, mainly at the expense of the steadily receding British economy. Both nations had recently acquired a stable political base -- the United States by successfully terminating the Civil War and Germany by achieving unification and defeating France in the Franco-Prussian War. From 1873 to 1914, the United States and Germany became the principal producers in certain leading sectors: steel and later automobiles for the United States and industrial chemicals for Germany.
The history books record that World War I broke out in 1914 and ended in 1918 and that World War II lasted from 1939 to 1945. However, it makes more sense to consider the two as a single, continuous "30 years' war" between the United States and Germany, with truces and local conflicts scattered in between. The competition for hegemonic succession took an ideological turn in 1933, when the Nazis came to power in Germany and began their quest to transcend the global system altogether, seeking not hegemony within the current system but rather a form of global empire. Recall the Nazi slogan ein tausendjähriges Reich (a thousand-year empire). In turn, the United States assumed the role of advocate of centrist world liberalism -- recall former U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "four freedoms" (freedom of speech, of worship, from want, and from fear) -- and entered into a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union, making possible the defeat of Germany and its allies.
World War II resulted in enormous destruction of infrastructure and populations throughout Eurasia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans, with almost no country left unscathed. The only major industrial power in the world to emerge intact -- and even greatly strengthened from an economic perspective -- was the United States, which moved swiftly to consolidate its position.
But the aspiring hegemon faced some practical political obstacles. During the war, the Allied powers had agreed on the establishment of the United Nations, composed primarily of countries that had been in the coalition against the Axis powers. The organization's critical feature was the Security Council, the only structure that could authorize the use of force. Since the U.N. Charter gave the right of veto to five powers -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- the council was rendered largely toothless in practice. So it was not the founding of the United Nations in April 1945 that determined the geopolitical constraints of the second half of the 20th century but rather the Yalta meeting between Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin two months earlier.
The formal accords at Yalta were less important than the informal, unspoken agreements, which one can only assess by observing the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union in the years that followed. When the war ended in Europe on May 8, 1945, Soviet and Western (that is, U.S., British, and French) troops were located in particular places -- essentially, along a line in the center of Europe that came to be called the Oder-Neisse Line. Aside from a few minor adjustments, they stayed there. In hindsight, Yalta signified the agreement of both sides that they could stay there and that neither side would use force to push the other out. This tacit accord applied to Asia as well, as evinced by U.S. occupation of Japan and the division of Korea. Politically, therefore, Yalta was an agreement on the status quo in which the Soviet Union controlled about one third of the world and the United States the rest.
Washington also faced more serious military challenges. The Soviet Union had the world's largest land forces, while the U.S. government was under domestic pressure to downsize its army, particularly by ending the draft. The United States therefore decided to assert its military strength not via land forces but through a monopoly of nuclear weapons (plus an air force capable of deploying them). This monopoly soon disappeared: By 1949, the Soviet Union had developed nuclear weapons as well. Ever since, the United States has been reduced to trying to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons (and chemical and biological weapons) by additional powers, an effort that, in the 21st century, does not seem terribly successful.
Until 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union coexisted in the "balance of terror" of the Cold War. This status quo was tested seriously only three times: the Berlin blockade of 1948–49, the Korean War in 1950–53, and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The result in each case was restoration of the status quo. Moreover, note how each time the Soviet Union faced a political crisis among its satellite regimes -- East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1981 -- the United States engaged in little more than propaganda exercises, allowing the Soviet Union to proceed largely as it deemed fit.
Of course, this passivity did not extend to the economic arena. The United States capitalized on the Cold War ambiance to launch massive economic reconstruction efforts, first in Western Europe and then in Japan (as well as in South Korea and Taiwan). The rationale was obvious: What was the point of having such overwhelming productive superiority if the rest of the world could not muster effective demand? Furthermore, economic reconstruction helped create clientelistic obligations on the part of the nations receiving U.S. aid; this sense of obligation fostered willingness to enter into military alliances and, even more important, into political subservience.
Finally, one should not underestimate the ideological and cultural component of U.S. hegemony. The immediate post-1945 period may have been the historical high point for the popularity of communist ideology. We easily forget today the large votes for Communist parties in free elections in countries such as Belgium, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Finland, not to mention the support Communist parties gathered in Asia -- in Vietnam, India, and Japan -- and throughout Latin America. And that still leaves out areas such as China, Greece, and Iran, where free elections remained absent or constrained but where Communist parties enjoyed widespread appeal. In response, the United States sustained a massive anticommunist ideological offensive. In retrospect, this initiative appears largely successful: Washington brandished its role as the leader of the "free world" at least as effectively as the Soviet Union brandished its position as the leader of the "progressive" and "anti-imperialist" camp.
ONE, TWO, MANY VIETNAMS
The United States' success as a hegemonic power in the postwar period created the conditions of the nation's hegemonic demise. This process is captured in four symbols: the war in Vietnam, the revolutions of 1968, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Each symbol built upon the prior one, culminating in the situation in which the United States currently finds itself -- a lone superpower that lacks true power, a world leader nobody follows and few respect, and a nation drifting dangerously amidst a global chaos it cannot control.
What was the Vietnam War? First and foremost, it was the effort of the Vietnamese people to end colonial rule and establish their own state. The Vietnamese fought the French, the Japanese, and the Americans, and in the end the Vietnamese won -- quite an achievement, actually. Geopolitically, however, the war represented a rejection of the Yalta status quo by populations then labeled as Third World. Vietnam became such a powerful symbol because Washington was foolish enough to invest its full military might in the struggle, but the United States still lost. True, the United States didn't deploy nuclear weapons (a decision certain myopic groups on the right have long reproached), but such use would have shattered the Yalta accords and might have produced a nuclear holocaust -- an outcome the United States simply could not risk.
But Vietnam was not merely a military defeat or a blight on U.S. prestige. The war dealt a major blow to the United States' ability to remain the world's dominant economic power. The conflict was extremely expensive and more or less used up the U.S. gold reserves that had been so plentiful since 1945. Moreover, the United States incurred these costs just as Western Europe and Japan experienced major economic upswings. These conditions ended U.S. preeminence in the global economy. Since the late 1960s, members of this triad have been nearly economic equals, each doing better than the others for certain periods but none moving far ahead.
When the revolutions of 1968 broke out around the world, support for the Vietnamese became a major rhetorical component. "One, two, many Vietnams" and "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh" were chanted in many a street, not least in the United States. But the 1968ers did not merely condemn U.S. hegemony. They condemned Soviet collusion with the United States, they condemned Yalta, and they used or adapted the language of the Chinese cultural revolutionaries who divided the world into two camps -- the two superpowers and the rest of the world.
The denunciation of Soviet collusion led logically to the denunciation of those national forces closely allied with the Soviet Union, which meant in most cases the traditional Communist parties. But the 1968 revolutionaries also lashed out against other components of the Old Left -- national liberation movements in the Third World, social-democratic movements in Western Europe, and New Deal Democrats in the United States -- accusing them, too, of collusion with what the revolutionaries generically termed "U.S. imperialism."
The attack on Soviet collusion with Washington plus the attack on the Old Left further weakened the legitimacy of the Yalta arrangements on which the United States had fashioned the world order. It also undermined the position of centrist liberalism as the lone, legitimate global ideology. The direct political consequences of the world revolutions of 1968 were minimal, but the geopolitical and intellectual repercussions were enormous and irrevocable. Centrist liberalism tumbled from the throne it had occupied since the European revolutions of 1848 and that had enabled it to co-opt conservatives and radicals alike. These ideologies returned and once again represented a real gamut of choices. Conservatives would again become conservatives, and radicals, radicals. The centrist liberals did not disappear, but they were cut down to size. And in the process, the official U.S. ideological position -- antifascist, anticommunist, anticolonialist -- seemed thin and unconvincing to a growing portion of the world's populations.
THE POWERLESS SUPERPOWER
The onset of international economic stagnation in the 1970s had two important consequences for U.S. power. First, stagnation resulted in the collapse of "developmentalism" -- the notion that every nation could catch up economically if the state took appropriate action -- which was the principal ideological claim of the Old Left movements then in power. One after another, these regimes faced internal disorder, declining standards of living, increasing debt dependency on international financial institutions, and eroding credibility. What had seemed in the 1960s to be the successful navigation of Third World decolonization by the United States -- minimizing disruption and maximizing the smooth transfer of power to regimes that were developmentalist but scarcely revolutionary -- gave way to disintegrating order, simmering discontents, and unchanneled radical temperaments. When the United States tried to intervene, it failed. In 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan sent troops to Lebanon to restore order. The troops were in effect forced out. He compensated by invading Grenada, a country without troops. President George H.W. Bush invaded Panama, another country without troops. But after he intervened in Somalia to restore order, the United States was in effect forced out, somewhat ignominiously. Since there was little the U.S. government could actually do to reverse the trend of declining hegemony, it chose simply to ignore this trend -- a policy that prevailed from the withdrawal from Vietnam until September 11, 2001.
Meanwhile, true conservatives began to assume control of key states and interstate institutions. The neoliberal offensive of the 1980s was marked by the Thatcher and Reagan regimes and the emergence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a key actor on the world scene. Where once (for more than a century) conservative forces had attempted to portray themselves as wiser liberals, now centrist liberals were compelled to argue that they were more effective conservatives. The conservative programs were clear. Domestically, conservatives tried to enact policies that would reduce the cost of labor, minimize environmental constraints on producers, and cut back on state welfare benefits. Actual successes were modest, so conservatives then moved vigorously into the international arena. The gatherings of the World Economic Forum in Davos provided a meeting ground for elites and the media. The IMF provided a club for finance ministers and central bankers. And the United States pushed for the creation of the World Trade Organization to enforce free commercial flows across the world's frontiers.
While the United States wasn't watching, the Soviet Union was collapsing. Yes, Ronald Reagan had dubbed the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and had used the rhetorical bombast of calling for the destruction of the Berlin Wall, but the United States didn't really mean it and certainly was not responsible for the Soviet Union's downfall. In truth, the Soviet Union and its East European imperial zone collapsed because of popular disillusionment with the Old Left in combination with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to save his regime by liquidating Yalta and instituting internal liberalization (perestroika plus glasnost). Gorbachev succeeded in liquidating Yalta but not in saving the Soviet Union (although he almost did, be it said).
The United States was stunned and puzzled by the sudden collapse, uncertain how to handle the consequences. The collapse of communism in effect signified the collapse of liberalism, removing the only ideological justification behind U.S. hegemony, a justification tacitly supported by liberalism's ostensible ideological opponent. This loss of legitimacy led directly to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein would never have dared had the Yalta arrangements remained in place. In retrospect, U.S. efforts in the Gulf War accomplished a truce at basically the same line of departure. But can a hegemonic power be satisfied with a tie in a war with a middling regional power? Saddam demonstrated that one could pick a fight with the United States and get away with it. Even more than the defeat in Vietnam, Saddam's brash challenge has eaten at the innards of the U.S. right, in particular those known as the hawks, which explains the fervor of their current desire to invade Iraq and destroy its regime.
Between the Gulf War and September 11, 2001, the two major arenas of world conflict were the Balkans and the Middle East. The United States has played a major diplomatic role in both regions. Looking back, how different would the results have been had the United States assumed a completely isolationist position? In the Balkans, an economically successful multinational state (Yugoslavia) broke down, essentially into its component parts. Over 10 years, most of the resulting states have engaged in a process of ethnification, experiencing fairly brutal violence, widespread human rights violations, and outright wars. Outside intervention -- in which the United States figured most prominently -- brought about a truce and ended the most egregious violence, but this intervention in no way reversed the ethnification, which is now consolidated and somewhat legitimated. Would these conflicts have ended differently without U.S. involvement? The violence might have continued longer, but the basic results would probably not have been too different. The picture is even grimmer in the Middle East, where, if anything, U.S. engagement has been deeper and its failures more spectacular. In the Balkans and the Middle East alike, the United States has failed to exert its hegemonic clout effectively, not for want of will or effort but for want of real power.
THE HAWKS UNDONE
Then came September 11 -- the shock and the reaction. Under fire from U.S. legislators, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) now claims it had warned the Bush administration of possible threats. But despite the CIA's focus on al Qaeda and the agency's intelligence expertise, it could not foresee (and therefore, prevent) the execution of the terrorist strikes. Or so would argue CIA Director George Tenet. This testimony can hardly comfort the U.S. government or the American people. Whatever else historians may decide, the attacks of September 11, 2001, posed a major challenge to U.S. power. The persons responsible did not represent a major military power. They were members of a nonstate force, with a high degree of determination, some money, a band of dedicated followers, and a strong base in one weak state. In short, militarily, they were nothing. Yet they succeeded in a bold attack on U.S. soil.
George W. Bush came to power very critical of the Clinton administration's handling of world affairs. Bush and his advisors did not admit -- but were undoubtedly aware -- that Clinton's path had been the path of every U.S. president since Gerald Ford, including that of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. It had even been the path of the current Bush administration before September 11. One only needs to look at how Bush handled the downing of the U.S. plane off China in April 2001 to see that prudence had been the name of the game.
Following the terrorist attacks, Bush changed course, declaring war on terrorism, assuring the American people that "the outcome is certain" and informing the world that "you are either with us or against us." Long frustrated by even the most conservative U.S. administrations, the hawks finally came to dominate American policy. Their position is clear: The United States wields overwhelming military power, and even though countless foreign leaders consider it unwise for Washington to flex its military muscles, these same leaders cannot and will not do anything if the United States simply imposes its will on the rest. The hawks believe the United States should act as an imperial power for two reasons: First, the United States can get away with it. And second, if Washington doesn't exert its force, the United States will become increasingly marginalized.
Today, this hawkish position has three expressions: the military assault in Afghanistan, the de facto support for the Israeli attempt to liquidate the Palestinian Authority, and the invasion of Iraq, which is reportedly in the military preparation stage. Less than one year after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, it is perhaps too early to assess what such strategies will accomplish. Thus far, these schemes have led to the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan (without the complete dismantling of al Qaeda or the capture of its top leadership); enormous destruction in Palestine (without rendering Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat "irrelevant," as Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said he is); and heavy opposition from U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East to plans for an invasion of Iraq.
The hawks' reading of recent events emphasizes that opposition to U.S. actions, while serious, has remained largely verbal. Neither Western Europe nor Russia nor China nor Saudi Arabia has seemed ready to break ties in serious ways with the United States. In other words, hawks believe, Washington has indeed gotten away with it. The hawks assume a similar outcome will occur when the U.S. military actually invades Iraq and after that, when the United States exercises its authority elsewhere in the world, be it in Iran, North Korea, Colombia, or perhaps Indonesia. Ironically, the hawk reading has largely become the reading of the international left, which has been screaming about U.S. policies -- mainly because they fear that the chances of U.S. success are high.
But hawk interpretations are wrong and will only contribute to the United States' decline, transforming a gradual descent into a much more rapid and turbulent fall. Specifically, hawk approaches will fail for military, economic, and ideological reasons. Undoubtedly, the military remains the United States' strongest card; in fact, it is the only card. Today, the United States wields the most formidable military apparatus in the world. And if claims of new, unmatched military technologies are to be believed, the U.S. military edge over the rest of the world is considerably greater today than it was just a decade ago. But does that mean, then, that the United States can invade Iraq, conquer it rapidly, and install a friendly and stable regime? Unlikely. Bear in mind that of the three serious wars the U.S. military has fought since 1945 (Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War), one ended in defeat and two in draws -- not exactly a glorious record.
Saddam Hussein's army is not that of the Taliban, and his internal military control is far more coherent. A U.S. invasion would necessarily involve a serious land force, one that would have to fight its way to Baghdad and would likely suffer significant casualties. Such a force would also need staging grounds, and Saudi Arabia has made clear that it will not serve in this capacity. Would Kuwait or Turkey help out? Perhaps, if Washington calls in all its chips. Meanwhile, Saddam can be expected to deploy all weapons at his disposal, and it is precisely the U.S. government that keeps fretting over how nasty those weapons might be. The United States may twist the arms of regimes in the region, but popular sentiment clearly views the whole affair as reflecting a deep anti-Arab bias in the United States. Can such a conflict be won? The British General Staff has apparently already informed Prime Minister Tony Blair that it does not believe so.
And there is always the matter of "second fronts." Following the Gulf War, U.S. armed forces sought to prepare for the possibility of two simultaneous regional wars. After a while, the Pentagon quietly abandoned the idea as impractical and costly. But who can be sure that no potential U.S. enemies would strike when the United States appears bogged down in Iraq?
Consider, too, the question of U.S. popular tolerance of nonvictories. Americans hover between a patriotic fervor that lends support to all wartime presidents and a deep isolationist urge. Since 1945, patriotism has hit a wall whenever the death toll has risen. Why should today's reaction differ? And even if the hawks (who are almost all civilians) feel impervious to public opinion, U.S. Army generals, burnt by Vietnam, do not. And what about the economic front? In the 1980s, countless American analysts became hysterical over the Japanese economic miracle. They calmed down in the 1990s, given Japan's well-publicized financial difficulties. Yet after overstating how quickly Japan was moving forward, U.S. authorities now seem to be complacent, confident that Japan lags far behind. These days, Washington seems more inclined to lecture Japanese policymakers about what they are doing wrong.
Such triumphalism hardly appears warranted. Consider the following April 20, 2002, New York Times report: "A Japanese laboratory has built the world's fastest computer, a machine so powerful that it matches the raw processing power of the 20 fastest American computers combined and far outstrips the previous leader, an I.B.M.-built machine. The achievement ... is evidence that a technology race that most American engineers thought they were winning handily is far from over." The analysis goes on to note that there are "contrasting scientific and technological priorities" in the two countries. The Japanese machine is built to analyze climatic change, but U.S. machines are designed to simulate weapons. This contrast embodies the oldest story in the history of hegemonic powers. The dominant power concentrates (to its detriment) on the military; the candidate for successor concentrates on the economy. The latter has always paid off, handsomely. It did for the United States. Why should it not pay off for Japan as well, perhaps in alliance with China?
Finally, there is the ideological sphere. Right now, the U.S. economy seems relatively weak, even more so considering the exorbitant military expenses associated with hawk strategies. Moreover, Washington remains politically isolated; virtually no one (save Israel) thinks the hawk position makes sense or is worth encouraging. Other nations are afraid or unwilling to stand up to Washington directly, but even their foot-dragging is hurting the United States.
Yet the U.S. response amounts to little more than arrogant arm-twisting. Arrogance has its own negatives. Calling in chips means leaving fewer chips for next time, and surly acquiescence breeds increasing resentment. Over the last 200 years, the United States acquired a considerable amount of ideological credit. But these days, the United States is running through this credit even faster than it ran through its gold surplus in the 1960s. The United States faces two possibilities during the next 10 years: It can follow the hawks' path, with negative consequences for all but especially for itself. Or it can realize that the negatives are too great. Simon Tisdall of the Guardian recently argued that even disregarding international public opinion, "the U.S. is not able to fight a successful Iraqi war by itself without incurring immense damage, not least in terms of its economic interests and its energy supply. Mr. Bush is reduced to talking tough and looking ineffectual." And if the United States still invades Iraq and is then forced to withdraw, it will look even more ineffectual.
President Bush's options appear extremely limited, and there is little doubt that the United States will continue to decline as a decisive force in world affairs over the next decade. The real question is not whether U.S. hegemony is waning but whether the United States can devise a way to descend gracefully, with minimum damage to the world, and to itself.
Immanuel Wallerstein is a senior research scholar at Yale University and author of, most recently, The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-First Century (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
雄鹰坠地（The Eagle Has Crash Landed）
美國正在走下坡路﹖這種說法恐怕很少會有人相信。衹有那些整天叫嚷著需要新政策來挽救美國衰落的美國鷹派人士才會相信這種說法。人們並不是在9.11事件暴露出美國弱點之後才開始認為美國的霸權地位已經結束了。實際上﹐早在70年代﹐美國作為一個全球性勢力的地位就已經開始衰退了﹐而恐怖分子的襲擊衹不過是加速了這種衰退。要想瞭解為什麼所謂的“美利堅統治下的和平”時期正在衰退﹐我們首先需要研究20世紀的地緣政治﹐尤其是20世紀最後30年的地緣政治。我們會產生一個簡單但又不可避免的結論﹕造就美國霸權地位的那些經濟﹑政治﹑軍事因素﹐正是無情地造成美國在未來衰落的同樣因素。
美國霸權地位的由來
美國越升為一個全球性強權經歷了一個漫長的過程﹐其重要發展起點是在1873年的全球經濟蕭條。當時美國和德國都開始獲得越來越多的全球市場份額﹐而這主要是以英國經濟不斷衰退為代價的。這兩個國家都是剛剛建立了一個穩定的政治基礎 — 美國成功地結束了內戰﹐而德國實現了統一並且在普法戰爭中擊敗了法國。1873~1914年﹐美國和德國各自在一些領域裡成為世界上的主要生產國﹐美國是在鋼鐵生產領域以及後來在汽車製造領域﹐而德國是在工業化工領域。
歷史書中記載的第一次世界大戰始於1914年﹐結束於1918年﹔第二次世界大戰始於1939年﹐結束於1945年。但是﹐如果我們把這兩次大戰當做一次德美之間持續30年並且包括了幾次停戰和內部衝突的戰爭來考慮就更便於理解了。這次爭奪霸主地位的競爭在1933年發生了一次意識形態上的轉折﹐當時納粹黨在德國上臺﹐德國開始企圖淩駕於整個全球系統之上﹐它不僅是要在當時現有的系統內獲得霸主地位﹐還想建立一個全球性的帝國 — 回想納粹當年的口號“千年帝國”。而美國則開始扮演中立的世界自由派的角色 — 當時的美國總統福蘭克林‧D‧羅斯福提出的“四項自由”（言論自由﹑信仰自由﹑免於恐懼﹑免於匱乏）﹐並且和蘇聯形成了戰略聯盟的關係﹐使得打敗德國及其盟國成為現實。
第二次世界大戰給亞歐大陸的基礎結構和人口造成了鉅大創傷﹐從太平洋到大西洋﹐幾乎沒有一個國家沒有受到創傷。唯一沒有受到創傷﹐而且從經濟的角度來看甚至還加強了自己力量的工業大國衹有美國﹐她馬上開始採取行動以鞏固自己的地位。
但是﹐熱衷稱霸的美國還是面臨著一些非常實際的政治障礙。在戰爭期間﹐同盟國各方同意建立聯合國﹐主要成員是那些共同參與迎戰軸心國的國家。安理會是聯合國非常重要的一項職能﹐是唯一能授權聯合國採取武力的機構。由於《聯合國憲章》給予了包括美國和蘇聯在內的五個國家否決權﹐在實際實施過程中﹐安理會的作用顯得非常無力。所以﹐決定了20世紀下半業地緣政治局限性的﹐並非是1945年4月成立的聯合國﹐而是前幾個月召開的﹐在美國總統羅斯福﹑英國首相邱吉爾和蘇聯領導人史達林之間舉行的雅爾塔會議。
雅爾塔會議中達成的那些私下的﹑未公開的協定﹐與那些正式協定相比更為重要。人們衹能通過後來數年中美國和蘇聯的行為來研究這些協定。1945年5月8日歐洲戰場結束戰爭時﹐蘇聯和西方國家（美﹑英﹑法）都把部隊部署在了一些特定地區 — 實際上是沿歐洲中心的一條被稱為“奧代爾‧奈斯”分界線（Oder-Neisse Line）的兩端部署。除了一些細微的調整﹐雙方都保持在這些位置上。事後看來﹐雅爾塔會議意味著雙方達成了某種協定﹐同意雙方保持現有的領地﹐並約定不會動用武力趕走對方。美國對日本的佔領和朝鮮的分治﹐表明這些不成文的協定在亞洲同樣被採用。從政治意義上來說﹐雅爾塔會議達成的協定規定了一種狀態 — 蘇聯控制三分之一的世界﹐而剩下的由美國來控制。
華盛頓方面還面對更加嚴重的軍事挑戰。蘇聯擁有著全世界最龐大的地面武裝力量﹐而美國政府卻面臨著國內壓力而不得不縮減陸軍規模﹐尤其是取消義務兵役制度。因此美國決定不靠地面武裝力量而是通過在核武器方面取得壟斷地位（加上能夠投放核武器的空軍）來表明自己的軍事力量。這種壟斷很快就結束了﹕到了1949年﹐蘇聯也發展出核武器。在此之後﹐美國的努力就減少到衹是阻止其他國家擁護核武器（以及生化武器）﹐而這種努力在21世紀中看來並不是很成功的。
直到1991年﹐美國和蘇聯都生活在“威懾力平衡”的冷戰狀態下。這種狀態僅僅受到三次嚴重的挑戰 — 1948~1949年的柏林封鎖﹑1950~1953年的朝鮮戰爭﹑1962年的古巴導彈危機。這幾次事件最終的結果都是回到了原先的狀態。值得注意的是﹐每當蘇聯處理其衛星國中發生的政治危機時 — 1953年在東德﹑1956年在匈牙利﹑1968年在捷克斯絡伐克﹑1981年在捷克 — 美國除了在輿論上進行了一些聲討活動﹐幾乎沒有採取過其他更激烈的行動﹐這使得蘇聯以它認為合適的方式處理了這些問題。
當然﹐這種被動的狀態並不存在於經濟領域。美國利用冷戰環境發動大規模經濟改造活動﹐得到了現實的利益﹐首先是在西歐﹐然後是在日本（也包括南朝鮮與臺灣）。這麼做的理由很明顯﹕如果世界其他國家沒有有效的需求﹐美國擁有超群強大的生產力有什麼用﹖而且﹐那些經濟改造工作使那些得到美國援助的國家對美國產生一種顧客性的責任感。這種責任感有利於使它們更情願與美國結成軍事聯盟﹐更重要的是在政治上附庸美國。
最後一點是﹐大家不應低估美國霸權中的意識形態和文化組成部分。1945年後的那段時期﹐可能是共產主義理想受歡迎的頂峰。今天﹐我們很容易忘記當時像比利時﹑法國﹑義大利﹑捷克斯洛伐克和芬蘭的共產黨﹐都在自由選舉中獲取了高額選票；更不用提的是共產黨在亞洲得到的擁護 — 在越南﹑印度﹑日本﹐以及在整個拉丁美洲；這還不包括那些當時沒有自由選舉制度或自由選舉制度受到限制的國家﹐像中國﹑希臘和伊朗﹐共產黨在那裡依然受到廣泛的支援。為了對付當時的形勢﹐美國保持了大規模的反共攻勢。現在回顧看來﹐美國的做法是比較成功的：美國至少像蘇聯把自己標榜為“先進”和“反帝國主義”陣營領導者一樣﹐成功地把自己標榜為“自由世界”的領導者。
一個﹑兩個﹑許多個越南
美國在二戰後成功變為一個霸權的過程中﹐也為其霸權勢力的衰敗埋下了伏筆。美國霸權的衰敗過程體現在四個標誌性事件上 — 越南戰爭﹑1968年的革命風潮﹑1989年柏林牆的倒塌和2001年的9.11事件。每個事件都發生在前一個事件的基礎之上﹐它們最終使美國發現﹐自己成為了一個缺乏真實力量的孤獨強權﹑一個無人追隨和缺乏尊敬的世界領袖﹑一個在一場無法控制的全球混亂中危險地漂流的國家（ a nation drifting dangerously amidst a global chaos it cannot control）。
什麼是越南戰爭﹖首先也是最重要的是﹐它是越南人民為結束殖民統治﹑建立自己國家的一次奮鬥。越南人民與法國﹑日本以及美國進行了戰鬥﹐最終取得了勝利﹐實際上是一項了不起的成就。但是﹐從地緣政治的角度來說﹐越南戰爭標誌著第三世界國家的人民不甘接受雅爾塔體系。越南之所以成為一個強有力的象徵﹐因為華盛頓方面愚蠢地投入了全部軍事力量﹐最終還是失敗了。的確﹐美國沒有使用核武器（一個被很多目光短淺的右派們責怪的決定）﹐但是﹐那麼做衹會造成雅爾塔協定被徹底破壞﹐並且可能引起一場毀滅人類的核武大戰。美國是不敢冒這個險的。
越南不僅僅是一次美國在軍事上的失敗﹐或一次對美國威信的打擊。這場戰爭對美國保持經濟主導地位的能力造成了重創。這場耗費鉅大的戰爭﹐用盡了美國1945年後本來非常充足的黃金儲備。更重要的是﹐在美國付出鉅大代價的同時﹐正是西歐和日本經濟騰飛的時期。這些情況終結了美國在全球經濟領域的主導地位。60年代之後﹐歐﹑美﹑日三方的經濟實力變得相差無幾﹐雖然其中某方在某一時期曾取得相對更大的成就﹐但沒有一方是遙遙領先的。
1968年﹐當革命在世界各地爆發之際﹐對越南的支援成為輿論攻勢的重要組成部分。“一個﹑兩個﹑許多個越南”和“胡﹑胡﹑胡志明”這樣的呼聲不僅在美國﹐在全球的許多大街小巷都可以聽到。[2] 1968年的那些革命者們不僅譴責美國的霸權﹐也譴責蘇聯和美國之間的秘密協定以及雅爾塔體系。他們接受了中國文化大革命提出的說法﹐也就是把世界分成“兩個超級大國和世界上的其餘國家”（the two superpowers and the rest of the world）。
對蘇聯和美國之間相互勾結的譴責﹐自然導致對那些和蘇聯關係密切的國家勢力﹐也就是對那些傳統共產黨勢力的譴責。但是1968年的革命家們還強烈抨擊傳統左派勢力的其他組成部分 — 第三世界的民族解放運動﹐西歐的社會民主運動和美國的新政派民主黨勢力（New Deal Democrats）﹐革命勢力將它們統統斥為和“美帝國主義”勾結。
對美蘇間互相勾結的譴責﹐加上對傳統左翼的抨擊﹐進一步削弱了美國賴以維持世界秩序的雅爾塔體系的合法性。同時它也破壞了溫和自由主義（centrist liberalism）作為惟一合法的全球性意識形態的地位。1968年的革命運動的直接政治影響很小﹐但在地緣政治和知識界產生的間接影響是鉅大的﹑不可替代的。溫和自由主義從1848年以來一直佔據的寶座上摔了下來﹐在那個寶座上﹐溫和自由主義者可以隨時傾向於保守勢力或激進勢力。這些不同的意識形態現在重新成為一種真正的立場選擇。保守派又成為了真正的保守派﹐激進派又成為了真正的激進派。溫和自由主義並沒有消失﹐衹不過是勢力縮小了而已。在這一過程中﹐美國的官方意識形態的立場 — 反法西斯主義﹑反共產主義和反殖民主義﹐對於越來越多的人來說已經顯得空洞並缺乏說服力。
無力的超級強權
始於70年代的國際經濟停滯﹐對於美國力量有兩個重大影響。第一﹐導致“發展主義”概念的崩潰。“發展主義”提出﹕所有採取了適當措施的國家﹐經濟上都能趕追上來。而這種說法正是當時勢力龐大的傳統左翼勢力思想體系的關鍵主張。但是﹐一個又一個遵循這種主張的政權陷入內部混亂﹑人民生活水平下降﹑對國際金融機構的債務依賴度加重和信用崩潰的困境中。60年代﹐美國為減少那些“發展主義”國家的破壞性﹐推行幫助第三世界國家脫離殖民統治的行動（美國的幫助很少包括革命主義國家）﹐雖然當時看上去很成功﹐但是到了70年代﹐卻統統被失控的秩序﹑瀕於爆發的不滿﹑無處發泄的激進情緒所取代。當美國試圖干預時﹐失敗了。1983年﹐美國總統雷根派軍隊到黎巴嫩維持秩序。結果﹐這些部隊被迫撤離了黎巴嫩。為了彌補這次失敗﹐雷根又入侵了格林納達這樣幾乎沒有軍隊的國家。而後﹐老布希又入侵了巴拿馬 — 另一個幾乎沒有軍隊的國家。但是﹐當老布希派兵到索馬里恢復秩序時﹐美國又被迫撤出了﹐而且是有些不光彩地撤出的。從此之後﹐美國政府實際上已無法挽救霸權衰落的趨勢﹐僅僅是選擇了無視這種趨勢的存在 — 這是一項美國自撤離越南到“9.11”事件時期一貫喜歡堅持的政策。
在這期間﹐真正的保守勢力開始在一些重要國家機構和跨國機構取得控制權。80年代﹐新自由派的攻勢是以撒切爾和雷根政府以及國際貨幣基金組織成為世界舞臺上重要角色為標誌的。在長達一個世紀的時期裡﹐保守勢力企圖把自己描繪成更智慧的自由主義﹐而現在溫和自由主義者們被迫辯稱自己是更有效的保守主義。保守勢力的安排很清楚。在國內﹐保守勢力試圖頒佈降低勞工工資﹑把對生產商的環保限制降到最低﹑減少國家福利支出的各種新政策。他們在這方面獲得的成功並不大﹐於是保守勢力又轉向了國際領域。達沃斯的世界經濟論壇為精英和媒體們提供了一個聚會場所。國際貨幣基金組織為各國的財政部長與中央銀行的銀行家們提供了一個俱樂部。而美國則努力推動世界貿易組織的建立﹐以加強跨國商業活動的自由流通。
當美國不經意之際﹐蘇聯崩潰了。的確﹐雷根曾授予蘇聯“邪惡帝國”的稱號﹐並大張旗鼓地叫嚷過推倒柏林牆。但美國並非真正有意讓蘇聯崩潰﹐並且也絕不該被算作蘇聯崩潰的導致者（the United States didn't really mean it and certainly was not responsible for the Soviet Union's downfall）。事實上﹐蘇聯及其東歐帝國版圖內的崩潰﹐是由於人們對傳統左翼的希望破滅﹐戈巴契夫為了拯救政權而清除雅爾塔體系﹐並開始國內自由化政策造成的。戈巴契夫成功地清除了雅爾塔體系﹐還是沒有挽救蘇聯（雖然可以說他幾乎成功）。In truth, the Soviet Union and its East European imperial zone collapsed because of popular disillusionment with the Old Left in combination with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to save his regime by liquidating Yalta and instituting internal liberalization (perestroika plus glasnost). Gorbachev succeeded in liquidating Yalta but not in saving the Soviet Union (although he almost did, be it said).
美國被蘇聯的突然崩潰搞得措手不及﹐不知道如何處理蘇聯崩潰所帶來的後果。共產主義理想的崩潰﹐實際上也意味著自由主義理想體系的崩潰。它剝奪了美國霸權存在的唯一理論依據﹐而這種依據正是自由主義的公開反對者們能達成一致的前提。當這種合法性消失後﹐直接導致了伊拉克對科威特的入侵。在雅爾塔體系存在的時候﹐伊拉克領導人薩達姆‧候賽因是斷然不敢這麼幹的。事後回顧看來﹐美國在海灣戰爭中所奮力取得的成就﹐不過是在原先的起點上達成了一種停戰狀態。但是﹐一個霸權勢力能夠僅僅滿足與一個地區中等勢力打個平手嗎﹖薩達姆表明了﹐你可以向美國挑釁﹐然後成功地逃避懲罰。薩達姆的傲慢挑戰比越南戰爭帶來的失敗﹐更加讓美國的右翼勢力﹑尤其是那些被認為是鷹派的傢夥們感到肝腸寸斷。這也就是為什麼現在他們如此熱衷於入侵伊拉克並將薩達姆政權毀滅。
在海灣戰爭到2001年的9.11事件這段時期裡﹐世界衝突集中在巴爾幹半島和中東。美國在這兩個地區都扮演了重要的外交角色。回顧過去﹐假使美國採取完全中立姿態﹐事情的結果將會是怎樣的不同呢﹖在巴爾幹地區﹐一個在經濟上取得了成功的多民族國家 — 南斯拉夫分裂了。在那十年期間﹐大部分這些分裂後的國家都開始進行種族主義運動﹐那裡的人民遭受了相當殘酷的暴力﹑普遍的人權踐踏和全面的戰爭。以美國為主導的外界干涉﹐促成了當地達成了停戰協定﹐終止了大多數令人震驚的暴力活動。但是﹐這些干涉根本不可能扭轉種族主義的進程。這種進程現在已經被鞏固﹑並且在某種程度上合法化了。沒有美國的介入﹐這些衝突的結果是否會有所不同﹖答案是：暴力活動也許會持續得更久﹐基本的結果恐怕不會有太大的不同。中東的情景就更沮喪了﹐美國介入的程度更高﹐但結果更慘。中東和巴爾幹相似之處在於﹐美國都沒有有效地發揮霸權的震懾作用。並非是美國缺乏這種願望或努力不夠﹐而是美國缺乏真正的實力。
鬆開枷鎖的蒼鷹
9.11事件發生了﹐在震驚之後﹐美國做出了反應。由於受到立法者們的猛烈抨擊﹐中央情報局現在聲稱曾經警告過布希政府潛在危險的存在。但是﹐即使是中央情報局對基地組織的密切注視﹐所掌握的專業技術也不可能預知（從而預防）這次恐怖襲擊。至少中央情報局局長喬治‧特內特（George Tenet）是這麼認為的。這種說法實在無法讓美國政府和美國人民安心。無論歷史學家們怎麼評價9.11事件的其他作用﹐它最重要的影響是對美國的威力造成了一次重大挑戰。事件的主謀並非一個重要軍事力量。他們屬於非國家勢力的一員﹐擁有堅定的決心﹑一定數量的資金﹑一批願意獻身的追隨者和一個在虛弱國家裡建立的強大基地。簡單地說﹐作為軍事力量﹐他們幾乎算不上什麼﹐但是他們成功地對美國本土實施了一次大膽的進攻。
喬治‧W‧布希執政後﹐對克林頓政府處理世界事務的方式非常不滿。布希和他的顧問們並不承認這一點﹐但是不容置疑的是他們都明白﹐克林頓所執行的路線是傑拉爾德‧福特（Gerald Ford）以來﹐所有美國總統 — 包括雷根和老布希一直執行的路線。甚至在9.11事件以前﹐也是布希政府所執行的路線。從布希政府處理2001年4月中美撞機事件的態度上﹐就可以看出美國的行事方式還是以謹慎為主的。
恐怖主義襲擊之後﹐布希改變了路線﹐向恐怖主義宣戰。他向美國人民保證勝利必將屬於美國﹐並且向全世界宣告“你要麼和我們站在一起﹐要麼就是跟美國為敵。”（you are either with us or against us）即使是美國政府中最保守的那些人也早就很不耐煩了﹐鷹派終於成為美國政策制定的主導力量。他們的立場很清晰﹐美國要發揮自己強大軍事力量的優勢。雖然無數外國領導人認為美國動武是不明智的﹐但是如果美國非要把自己的意志強加於人﹐那些領導人也無可奈何。鷹派們認為美國應當採取帝國主義行動﹐有兩個原因﹕首先﹐美國這麼做不會受到懲罰；其次﹐如果美國不使用軍事力量﹐美國將越來越受到擠兌。
目前﹐鷹派的這種立場表現在三個方面﹕在阿富汗的軍事行動﹐對以色列清除巴勒斯坦政權的實質性支援﹐對伊拉克的入侵（據說現在處在軍事準備階段）。9.11事件結束尚不到一年﹐現在評價美國的這種策略能達成什麼效果還為時尚早。到目前為止﹐在美國的策劃下﹐阿富汗塔利班政權倒臺了﹐但是並沒有徹底消滅基地組織和擒獲其領導人。巴勒斯坦遭到了鉅大的破壞﹐但是巴勒斯坦領導人阿拉法特並未像以色列總理沙龍所說的那樣變得“無關緊要”。而美國入侵伊拉克的計劃則遭到美國在歐洲和中東地區盟友們的強烈反對。
鷹派們針對最近這些事件的理解是﹐大家對美國行動的反對雖然很強烈﹐但是大部分都停留口頭上。不論是西歐﹑蘇聯﹑中國還是沙烏地阿拉伯﹐都沒有真正和美國決裂。換句話說﹐鷹派們相信華盛頓方面的確已經僥倖成功了。鷹派們設想當美國真的入侵伊拉克時﹐結果還是一樣的﹐在這之後當美國在世界其他地區行使權威時﹐譬如在北朝鮮﹑哥倫比亞或者還包括印度尼西亞﹐結果都會是美國可以為所欲為。具有諷刺意味的是﹐鷹派的這種結論﹐在很大程度上﹐也反映了國際左翼勢力的結論。他們強烈反對美國的政策﹐是因為擔心美國很有可能會獲得成功。
但是﹐鷹派的理解是錯誤的﹐而且衹會導致美國衰落的加速﹐把一種逐漸的衰落變成一種更迅速和更激烈的暴跌（ contribute to the United States' decline, transforming a gradual descent into a much more rapid and turbulent fall）。更明確地說﹐鷹派的行事方法將會由於軍事﹑經濟以及意識形態等多方面的原因而遭到失敗。
無疑﹐軍事力量將繼續是美國最強大的一張王牌；實際上它也是美國唯一的王牌了。在今天﹐美國操縱著世界上最令人生畏的軍事工具。如果考慮到那些無可匹敵的新軍事技術﹐美國目前的軍事優勢比十年前更加鉅大。但是﹐這意味著美國可以快速地征服伊拉克並且建立一個更穩定並且對美國更友好的政權嗎﹖不太可能。不要忘記美國軍隊在1945年後陷入的三場主要戰爭 — 朝鮮戰爭﹑越南和海灣戰爭﹐一場打敗了﹐兩場以平手結束。這並非是一段光榮的歷史。
薩達姆的軍隊和塔利班不一樣﹐他的軍隊比塔利班的更加團結。攻打伊拉克需要投入更多地面部隊﹐將不得不依靠地面戰鬥來攻入巴格達。這或許會造成美軍大量的人員傷亡。部隊需要場地來搞戰前部署﹐而沙烏地阿拉伯已經明確表明不會在這方面幫助美國。科威特或土耳其會幫忙嗎﹖假如美國把所有籌碼都壓上﹐或許會成功。同時﹐我們也可以預測﹐薩達姆將動用所有可以動用的武器。恰恰美國擔心的就是薩達姆使用那些“暗器”。美國也許可以強迫該地區的國家服從自己﹐但共識是﹐美國的做法反映了一種反阿拉伯的深度偏見。在這種性質的衝突裏美國能取勝嗎﹖英國總參謀部已明確告訴布萊爾首相﹐他們不相信美國會贏。
而且﹐第二戰場的問題永遠存在。海灣戰爭之後﹐美國軍隊一直在為同時打兩場地區級戰役的可能性做準備。經過一段時間﹐五角大樓悄悄地放棄了這一不現實並耗費鉅大的目標。但是誰能保證美國潛在的敵人不會在她陷入與伊拉克的戰爭時發動攻擊﹖
還需要考慮的是美國人對戰敗的承受能力。美國人總是在熱烈愛國主義（每位戰爭期間的總統都得到了美國人民的支援）和深度孤立主義的傾向之間徘徊。自1945年以來﹐一旦傷亡率上升﹐愛國主義就要碰壁了。美國人今天的反應為什麼會有所不同﹖即使鷹派（幾乎都是文官）感到可以不顧公眾意見﹐那些還記得越南教訓的陸軍將軍們是不會這麼想的。
經濟方面又是怎樣呢﹖在80年代﹐日本創造的經濟奇跡使無數美國觀察家們變得歇斯底里﹐直到90年代日本的經濟困境被大肆宣傳﹐他們才平靜下來。但是﹐經過一陣日本如何飛速恢復的誇大宣傳之後﹐美國看上去還是洋洋得意的﹐自信日本已經被遠遠甩在了身後。在這些日子裡﹐華盛頓方面似乎更傾向給日本政客們上課﹐告訴他們都做錯了什麼。
這種必勝的信心幾乎看不到有什麼事實根據。2002年4月20日《紐約時報》報導﹕一個日本實驗室製造出世界上最快的電腦﹐這台機器的運算速度相當於20台美國電腦加在一起﹐並遠遠超過一直處於領先地位的IBM電腦。這項成就證明﹐這場被大多數美國工程師們自認為穩操勝券的科技競賽﹐遠沒結束。該報導接著分析說﹐美國和日本兩國在科技研究方面的側重點﹐形成了鮮明的對比。日本的設備是為分析氣候變化而建造的﹐美國的設備是為了類比武器。這種對比鮮明地表現出了一個歷史中關於霸權勢力最古老的故事 — 佔主導地位的勢力專注於（而這是有害的）軍事實力﹐而霸權的潛在接替者則專注於發展經濟（ This contrast embodies the oldest story in the history of hegemonic powers. The dominant power concentrates (to its detriment) on the military; the candidate for successor concentrates on the economy）。後者一直都會獲得龐大的實在利益。美國當年就是這樣的﹐為什麼日本不會也像美國一樣獲得龐大的實在利益﹖也許是在和中國結盟後﹖
最後一點是意識形態領域。現在﹐美國的經濟顯得很脆弱﹐考慮到鷹派戰略帶來的高昂軍費開支﹐這個問題就更突出了。此外﹐華盛頓堅持一意孤行﹐實際上沒有一個國家（除了以色列）認為鷹派的立場是理性的或者是值得支援的。其他國家不敢或不願意直接面對美國﹐但是﹐僅僅它們的觀望態度﹐對於美國來說也是有害的。
美國的反應不僅僅是傲慢地強迫其他國家﹐傲慢本身就有副作用。這次強迫其他國家投入﹐意味著下一次將得到更少的投入。冷漠地默許培養了對美國不滿。在過去的20年裡﹐美國獲得了相當可觀的意識形態聲望。但是現在﹐美國正在以比60年代消耗黃金盈餘更快的速度消耗掉她的聲望。
在未來的十年裡﹐美國將面對兩種可能性﹕她可以繼續鷹派路線﹐對所有人尤其是她自己產生負面影響。或者她能意識到負面影響太大了。《衛報》（Guardian）的西蒙‧提斯戴爾（Simon Tisdall）爭論說﹐即使不考慮國際間的公眾意見﹐美國還是不可能在不對自身造成破壞的情況下打贏對伊拉克的戰爭﹐尤其是不可能不影響到自身的經濟利益和能源供應。布希先生已經到了嘴上強硬但看起來不起作用的境地了。如果美國還是決定入侵伊拉克最後卻被迫撤退﹐她會顯得更不起作用。
布希總統的選擇是有限的。無疑﹐美國作為一個在世界事務中起決定作用的勢力﹐將在今後十年裡繼續衰落。真正的問題不在於美國霸權是否會衰落﹐而在於美國能否找到一條不失體面的引退之路﹐一條對世界和對自己造成傷害最小的道路。
