美国的兴衰之争:Robert Kagan debates Gideon Rachman on if America is in decline.

作者:丹尼尔·德雷泽  叶民强/译  2012年11月《国外理论动态》

编按关于美国是否在衰落这一热点问题,美国《The Foreign Policy Initiative》在2012年2月15日组织了一场对话。主持人丹尼尔·W德雷泽(Dan Drezner是塔夫茨大学弗莱彻学院国际政治学教授,《外交政策》特约编辑。持肯定观点的正方代表吉迪恩·拉赫曼(Giden Rachman)是英国《金融时报》的外交事务首席评论员,《零和未来:焦虑时代中的美国权力》(Zero-Sum FutureAmerican Power in an Age of Anxiety)的作者,反方代表罗伯特·卡根(Rbert Kagan)是美国布鲁金斯学会高级研究员以及《世界美国造》(The World American Made)的作者。

  德雷泽:我很荣幸能主持两位的讨论。两位都各自写出了有趣而又富有真知灼见的著作,尽管在其中你们对于未来世界秩序的意见大相径庭。拉赫曼相信“焦虑时代”(the Age of Anxiety)已经来临,它在很大程度上是因为美国权力乃至普遍意义上的西方政治经济模式的衰退。卡根却反驳了美国在衰退的观点,指出当前很多评论家在很大程度上都夸大了美国过去拥有的力量,因而认为美国当前的权力资源仍然强劲有力。
  两位似乎都认同美国的权力是世界秩序和繁荣的保障。拉赫曼在《零和未来》一书中断言,“一个强大、成功、自信的美国依旧是世界稳定和繁荣的最大福音”。卡根发表于《新共和》上的《世界美国造》一书的节选断定:如果美国的力量衰退,世界的秩序也将随之下滑,它将被其他类型的秩序所取代,从而反映主导它的世界大国的欲望和气质。从这个维度上说,两位先生志趣相投,不过却与约翰·伊肯伯里(John Ikenberry)诸君大异其趣。伊肯伯里在《自由的利维坦》(Liberal Leviathan)一书中认为,正在崛起的新兴国家也将支持美国及其盟友在60多年前创建的自由主义秩序
  我这里作为开始先问吉迪恩几个问题。您的书是在“阿拉伯之春”、美国重返亚太、欧债危机进入激烈的新阶段、中国的增长开始露出减速迹象等事件之前出版的。这些事件中是否有哪一个引起您反思自己的观点?如果没有,那卡根所断言的美国仍将站稳主导地位的观点是否能减轻您的焦虑?最后,据我们所知,《世界美国造》这本书找到了一个非常有影响力的受众:巴拉克·奥巴马很明显是其中的粉丝之一。如果您希望有一位世界领袖来阅读《零和未来》,那会是谁?为什么?

  拉赫曼:您说对了,卡根和我确实都赞同美国的力量对于世界稳定与繁荣的重要性。区别在于,我确信我们在见证着美国力量正在遭受严重侵蚀。这是大势所趋,西方主导的世界正在让位于一个经济和政治力量更具竞争活力的新秩序。
  关于我的书出版之后在2010年初所发生的大事如何影响到了我的论点,您提出了一些非常精彩的问题。在直接回答这些问题之前,我应该简要地解释一下我使用“焦虑时代”一词的用意。我在书中指出,全球化并不仅仅是经济现象。它也是金融危机发生之前的30年的核心地缘政治的发展。它在世界主要大国之间缔造了一个共同利益的网络,从而由所有大国纽结成一个共同资本主义体系单一世界秩序取代了冷战时期分裂的世界体系。在此期间,如果你去过达沃斯,你就会发现无论是中国的、欧盟的还是美国的领袖们,都说着诸如需要鼓励世界贸易、跨国投资等等相似的话题。他们共享着关于世界应该如何运转的重要假设。
  我将从1991年到2008年的这段时期描述为“乐观时代”(Age of Optimism),因为世界上的主要大国都有理由对全球化的世界体系为它们服务的方式感到满意。开始于1991年的印度改革带来了经济繁荣以及随之而来的民族自信明显增强。欧盟的规模因为吸纳了前苏联集团成员国而扩大了一倍多。拉丁美洲曾一度陷于债务危机的泥淖,但在“乐观时代”末期,巴西也首次作为一个全球性大国而得到了国际社会的重视。所有后苏联时代的怀旧者,甚至新时期俄罗斯的领导人们,也都是全球化世界的热心参与者。
非常重要的是,对于中国和美国来说,1991年到2008年是共同的“乐观时代”。在此期间,中国经济增速如此之快以至于其规模每8年左右就翻一番。中国人能明显地看到他们的国家以及他们的家庭都变得越来越繁荣。而美国也依旧是世界上唯一的超级大国。硅谷的成长、谷歌以及苹果公司的崛起等等,在美式资本主义的独特创造力中再次展现了美国人的自信。美国的政治和经济思维主导着国际争论的条件。事实上,所谓的“全球化”几乎就是“美国化”的同义词
  美国的自信对于世界体系而言曾经非常重要。这曾经使得美国接受了中国的崛起,如果从另一种角度来看,后者似乎构成了威胁。在“乐观时代”,连续多位美国总统都欢迎中国经济的发展。他们所持的理由是资本主义将作为“特洛伊木马”(capitalism would act as a Trojan horse),从内部改变中国的制度如果中国接受经济自由,那么政治自由肯定会接踵而来。但是,如果中国不能接受资本主义,那在经济上也将失败
  在2008年,爆发了大规模的经济和金融危机,但危机发生在西方而不是在中国。这一不期而至的事件,加速了已有的一个趋势:那就是经济权力中心正由西方转移到东方,包括由美国转移到中国。从那时起,越来越难说全球化创造了双赢的世界。相反,美国人有理由开始担心,一个更加富有、更加有实力的中国,是否同时意味着一个相对变穷、变弱的美国。这就是我把自己的书起名为《零和未来》的原因。
  现在,我知道卡根质疑所谓经济权力已经发生转移的论点。他说美国占世界经济总量的比例一直较为稳定,大致为25%。但是,我读到的数据并非如此英国《经济学家》杂志目前预测:中国将在2018年前成为实际水平(扣除物价因素)上的世界最大经济体。杰弗里·萨克斯()今年2月9日发表在《金融时报》上的文章说得好:

"在1980年,美国占世界收入的比例是24.6%(按购买力平价计算),但是到了2011年,它变成了19.1%,国际货币基金组织(IMF)预测,到2016年它还会下降到17.6%
  相反,中国在1980年仅占世界收入的2.2%,但是到2011年已经增加到了14.4%。据IMF预测,到2016年,中国将以占世界收入18%的比例超越美国如果这还不是改变世界的转变,那很难想象它会是什么。"
  我知道统计数据不同导致的争论会让人思维混乱,那就让我通过自己对全球采访的切身感受,来加深对于中国因其经济实力快速增长而不断提升影响力的印象。在巴西,我被告知迪尔马·罗塞夫总统的首次国事访问选择前往北京,而不是华盛顿,因为中国作为巴西的最大贸易伙伴显得更加重要。在布鲁塞尔,他们充满希望地谈到中国(而不是美国)开出了大额支票来缓解欧元区的危机。当然,中国在亚洲的影响力也越加明显。
  这种经济和政治实力的转移,对世界秩序具有重要影响。一个弱化的美国,更不乐意也无力在解决世界经济和政治危机中扮演一种领导者的角色。再也不会有援助欧洲的“马歇尔计划”,甚至也不会有正如亚洲和俄罗斯危机发生时期那样的一个由美国领导的“拯救世界委员会”(committee to save the world)
  面对中东发生的动荡,比如在利比亚,美国更乐意做的是幕后的领导。与此同时,美国已撤出伊拉克,也正在从阿富汗撤军。请不要误会,我认为奥巴马减少全球军事承诺完全是明智的,特别是考虑到严峻的预算前景。但是我们无可争议地来到了一个新的时代。现在没有哪位美国总统可以说美国会为了确保其目标而“承受任何负担”。
  现在,让我来解答您提到的几个问题。欧元危机的早期阶段在我的书中具有重要意义。它接下来的发展阶段进一步强化了我的论点。欧盟是一个建立在共赢经济逻辑上的经典案例。欧盟缔造者们的想法是经济合作以及分享繁荣将创造一个积极的政治动态机制。50多年来,它一直运作得很漂亮。但是,共赢的逻辑已经发生逆转欧盟国家不再感到因聚生强,取而代之的是越来越担心正在相互拖累,其结果是欧洲内部掀起了政治紧张的浪潮,尤其是爆发了反德情绪。这已经带来全球影响,其中之一就是美国重返亚太的计划假定欧洲不再需要关注,而这种假定令我怀疑
  至于美国的重返亚太计划,作为应对中国力量崛起的举措,我认为这是可以预见的,也是合理的。但我不确定它是否会奏效。美国在亚太的盟友们正面临着一种有趣的两难境地日本、印度、澳大利亚以及韩国既和中国建立了最重要的贸易合作伙伴关系,又和美国建立了最重要的战略合作伙伴关系。除非中国经常过火地使用手腕以至于惊吓了四邻,否则随着时间的推移,这些经济纽带比起与美国的军事关系将显得更有分量。因此,中国在亚洲的影响力将稳定地增长,代价是美国影响力的下降
所有的这一切,当然是建立在中国经济持续增长的假定之上。因此要怎么看诸如“中国的经济增长正在变慢”的迹象呢?对于这个问题,我并不感到意外。事实上,我想进一步指出,中国的经济和政治系统并不稳定,而且危机四伏一旦危机到来,很多美国以及其他地方的人就会踊跃地宣称中国的崛起只是海市蜃楼。这是一个拥有巨大历史意义的长期过程(This is a long-term process of huge historical significance),正如美国在19世纪的崛起。对于一个发展中的大陆经济体的崛起而言,美国的历史告诉我们,政治的动荡完全有可能同时发生。毕竟,美国打了内战,却依然在20世纪初成为世界头号强国。
  最后,您问到了“阿拉伯之春”。它可以从两个完全不同的方向来解读。如果阿拉伯世界成功地接受了民主和经济自由,那将重申充满希望的“乐观时代”的叙事,从而宣示民主和经济自由还在向全世界扩散,从而建造一种更加互助、自由的国际秩序(也可以说是所谓“约翰·伊肯伯里的世界”)。
  从长远来看,我依旧对“乐观时代”充满希望,因此我觉得这是“阿拉伯之春”发展的方向。 然而在未来10年,在我看来,“阿拉伯之春”将陷入“焦虑时代”的黑暗叙事(the Arab Spring will play into the darker narrative of an Age of Anxiety),其特征是在失败国家出现跨边界冲突、狭隘主义反西方意识形态抬头,以及流离失所的人口进行大迁移。
  至于我梦想中的读者,我并不认为我能够吃定奥巴马。但是坦诚地说,我的书更胜于描述事实而非开处方。“零和未来”一词更多地是对潜在未来的写照而非建议。事实上,乐于接受“零和”的逻辑将会是危险的。我建议的全面反应涉及美国需集中精力重建国内经济实力,有意捍卫自由世界秩序的原则,同时防御独裁型世界强国的崛起。从广义上讲,我认为这正是奥巴马政府当下的政策。
  与其提名一个理想读者,不如让我告诉您一个实际的读者。我最近见到了一位欧盟委员会委员,他正处于欧元危机的核心决策层。他告诉我说他已经读过了我的书,并很感兴趣,然后还加了句“我的工作就是要证明你是错的”。基于这场危机对于欧洲和西方的重要意义,我希望他能成功。


  德雷泽:谢谢吉迪恩的回应!现在讨论转向卡根先生,这里也有几个问题。吉迪恩在回应中说您关于美国力量持续性的数据有些过时。持有类似观点的并非只有他一人。罗伯特·佩普(Robert Pape)几年前在《国家利益》上也发表过相同的观点,还有爱德华·卢斯(Edward Luce)最近也在《金融时报》上表达了相似的观点。
  如果不过多陷入数据的繁琐争议之中,其他的数据序列很可能会显示出美国自20世纪60年代以来的更加长期性的衰落。这些数据上的问题对您的论点会有多大的影响?更直接地说,我们的讨论应当如何深入?吉迪恩关于中国的论述无可非议,哪怕中国经济增长减速,那会减缓其崛起吗?美国在19世纪后期也遭遇过一些严重的坎坷,却依旧成为了世界工业的领头羊
  吉迪恩的回应切中了关于美国地位的另一个还在酝酿中的问题:哪怕美国并非在衰退,其长期盟友也正处于严重的麻烦之中。美国的北约盟国正被主权债务危机纠缠,日本也有着自身的人口问题。至于其他的盟友,正如吉迪恩指出的,他们变得与中国高度相互依存。还有一些拥有与美国相似价值观且正在崛起的国家,如巴西和印度,但极不明朗的是它们追随美国是否仅仅是一种战术。如果没有了支持者,美国还能继续当领袖吗?
  最后,我们知道奥巴马已经从《新共和》上读到了您那本书的节选部分。米特·罗姆尼有读过吗?我很好奇,因为您是他的外交政策顾问,而这位共和党总统候选人在这个问题上的观点是什么呢?在这一问题上,奥巴马相信美国正在衰退,但与此同时他又相信这依旧是美国的世纪,似乎与您的观点相矛盾。
卡根:非常感谢两位生动而又重要的探讨。奥巴马提及了我的书,我感到很高兴,这不仅是因为显而易见的理由,而且也是因为他开启了一场真正有用的、关于美国和其他国家在世界舞台上相对地位的辩论。多年以前,我们就看似已经滑落到一个“后美国世界”,可却并没有进行严格分析以确定这样的一种说法是否真的是一个对国际体系的确切描述。我相信情况并非如此。
  首先,关于我作为论据的GDP数据,我认为美国从1969年以来占世界 GDP的比例一直相当稳定地维持在大约1/4。这一观点基于美国政府提供的数据,具体可以在以下网站找到:http://www.ersusdag·v/Data/Macr·ec·n·mics/。
  当然,任何为研究这个问题不怕麻烦的人会很快发现,类似数据随处可见。IMF自身的数据是经常变动的,即使是历史数据。举个例子,我曾写信回应卢斯和萨克斯,依据IMF 2010年《世界经济展望报告》,按购买力平价计算,美国在1980年占世界GDP总量的比例是22.499%。而在2007年,也就是此次大衰退的前一年,美国所占的比重是21.289%。二者相差并不大。然而,在IMF 2011年的报告中,又把美国在1980年所占的比重写为24.6%,从而使转变看起来更加明显。究竟哪一个数据是对的呢?至于IMF的预测,在围绕它们构建一个完整的全球性理论之前,我们能等着看它们是对是错吗?它们也经常把这些数据调高或调低,而且当美国摆脱衰退时,情况看起来可以完全不一样。
  但是无论如何,我们应该多看重这些统计数据呢?当然,只能部分参考。毫无疑问,随着中国在世界经济总量中的比重的增加,中国在一些方面的影响力也会增加。但是,我发现有些情形值得注意,那就是在所有这些讨论中,这些人在指出中国占世界GDP总量的比例增长的同时,却忽视了中国的人均GDP只是美国和其他经济强国的若干分之一美国的人均GDP超过4万美元,中国的只有4000美元多一点,大致只与安哥拉及伯利兹持平。哪怕乐观的预测是对的,到2030年中国的人均GDP也仅仅达到美国的一半,大致相当于斯洛文尼亚今天的水平。思考如果中国成为经济主导者,那将意味着什么,是一件有趣的事,因为它史无前例在过去,主导世界的国家同时也是世界上最富有的国家。
  在地缘政治和权力的问题上,大国自身的经济规模并非最重要的衡量标准。如果是,那中国在1800年就是世界上最强大的国家,当时中国的GDP占世界总量的比重最大。因此,接下来的问题是中国是否能把其经济能量转化为地缘政治影响。
  毫无疑问,这在一定程度上能实现。但是权力和影响不仅仅源自单独的经济力量,中国已经对此做出了最好的证明。在过去的几年,当美国的经济下滑而中国的经济蓬勃发展时,美国却高调地证明了自己在东亚及东南亚的地位,而中国的地位同时却恶化了。事实上,中国越多地使用新长出来的肌肉,就会越多地激起地区反应的火花,而这些地区随之便会寻求美国的救助。拉赫曼坚持预言日本将向中国倾斜,但是所有的信号都在指示相反的方向,而相似的信号不仅仅对日本,对中国其他邻国来说也是如此。尽管中国是这些国家的最大贸易伙伴,却并不能增加其对后者的影响力。
  据我了解,就连巴西人也越来越不乐于仅仅成为中国人的原料供应者没有哪个国家的经济像澳大利亚一样依赖中国,但是看看新的美军基地,澳大利亚就只欢迎美军踏上他们的领土。国际贸易并不哺育礼让或者战略上的依赖。正如很多人指出的那样,1914年的德国和英国也互为最大的贸易伙伴
  事实上,中国在走向成为世界性大国从而与美国平起平坐的道路,还有很多障碍要克服。首先,它要解决的是强邻的恐惧和猜疑,尤其是和中国的崛起速度一样快的印度。虽是老生常谈,但美国真的在上天的眷顾下拥有优越的地理环境。在它的大洲没有其他大国,不用面对来自邻国的直接威胁。中国周围被曾经的和未来的对手包围,甚至连冷战时苏联也处于更好的地理位置。
这些就是对主持人德雷泽关于美国盟国的状态问题的部分回答。印度和巴西也许和美国并不一条心,但是这并没有那么重要。美国的影响并不至于能够在所有时候让别国唯命是从,它永远不可能这样,甚至对冷战高峰期的欧洲也没做到那样。恰恰相反,美国是通过影响世界整体的平衡来帮助其确定地位的。在美国和中国有可能成为对手的未来的某一天,一个强大的印度会成为美国的帮手,不管那时新德里和华盛顿的关系是否友好。
  至于欧洲,请让我们把视野放得更广阔一点。与曾饱受战火蹂躏而被美国自从1945年就当作盟友传承下来的欧洲相比,今天的欧洲尽管承受着经济危机,但依旧是一个超级大国,的确也是很值得拥有的好盟友。
  拉赫曼:我在一个重要的问题上同意您的观点。政治力量与经济份额并不相同。因此就算中国在2018年前后能成为世界最大的经济体,但美国依旧会在未来的一段时间内作为世界政治的主导力量。美国的联盟网络、军事力量、技术实力、“软实力”、政治稳定性和地理位置等等,都是中国所缺乏的资产。
  但是,尽管政治力量和经济规模并不是一回事,不过它们肯定也是密切相关的。因此,随着中国变得更加富裕,其地缘政治力量就会增长,这也会变成对美国更大的挑战。中国增长的财富使其有更多的资金可用于海外资产、国际援助和军事开支。尤其是,中国投资和市场的诱惑将会成为塑造别国行为的有力工具
  我们从现在的欧洲就能看到这些。中国提供信贷和优厚合同的能力,无论在人权还是环境方面,都正在使得欧洲人明显地减少与中国对抗的意愿
  这就是我为什么认为您指出的人均GDP并不能令人欣慰的原因。是的,确实美国人的平均财富在未来的几十年里甚至永远都会比中国人的平均数高,但是,卢森堡的人均GDP已经大大高于中国和美国,却对地缘政治并没有影响,因为卢森堡的人口太少。
  在很大程度上,这都只是简单的算术问题。日本永远也成不了第一,因为其人口不到美国的一半。从经济的角度来说,中国几乎可以肯定会成为第一,因为其人口是美国的4倍。中国居民在平均收入上的相对贫困将会使得中国成为另类的超级大国an unfamiliar sort of superpower他们比我们富有的同时又比我们贫穷。这可能使得中国相对内向,或者它也可能使得中国在寻求资源以为其崛起提供助力和满足其人口的需求时,会变得更有攻击性。我认为,中国在崛起的过程中最大的变数是其是否会因为民主(如果它到来的话)进程的刺激而导致国家的分裂,特别是分裂活动最近在西藏和新疆抬头。但是,尽管这些地区占中国领土的一大块,占中国人口总数的比例却只有大约2%。
  此外,面临麻烦问题的不仅仅只有中国。你正确地指出了美国的持久优势,但是快速增长的国债增加了美国遭遇严重财政紧缩的风险。在主权债务问题上,我们刚刚在欧洲发现那个古老的经济学笑话的真实性,那就是“事情不可能永远如此发展下去,也不要如此”。美国很难按现有成本水平持续运行其债务。甚至按一个可控的、理性的方向来管理债务,也会对美国的开支和力量部署带来严重影响。
  我同意,美国和中国之间的力量平衡很大程度上取决于其他国家的选择。你说对了,我可能对鸠山由纪夫担任首相时期日本向中国倾斜的印象过于深刻,那已经被证明是短暂的。尽管如此,这也是一个有趣的插曲,因为它预示一个新兴世界秩序的中心点。随着中国变得更加强大,美国不能断定传统的盟国或者其他民主国家还将忠于美国。
  在上届美国总统大选中,候选人们就做了很多工作来推销“民主国家同盟”(league of democracies.的想法。但是,在过去四年里,我们看到民主国家并不总是团结一致。在哥本哈根气候峰会上,巴西、印度和南非都站到了中国而不是美国那一边它们作为发展中国家的身份盖过了它们作为民主国家的身份。也是这些国家谴责北约领导的对利比亚的干预,因为其导致了利比亚实质性的军事冲突。它们对西方干预的怀疑,胜过它们对人权的支持。
在世界范围内争夺人心与智慧的战役中,美国作为世界先进民主国家的身份将会是一大优势。但是,也不能低估中国利用对西方几百年来的统治的普遍怨恨的能力
  在军事硬实力方面,美国仍遥遥领先。但是我认为中国和美国不大可能会走向战争。经济实力,而非军事力量或者“软”实力,将会主导美国和中国之间的竞赛。而且我想中国在经济地位方面领先美国的时刻正在快速到来。
  卡根:亲爱的吉迪恩,我想现在我们已经在很大范围内达成了共识。我们俩都同意,美国将依然是主导性的全球力量,并且暂时拥有比中国更优越的独特优势。我们也一样都同意,在未来几年里中国将提出一种严峻的挑战,对美国人的能力和智慧构成考验
  美国在国内面临着严重的问题,其中尤其是因为保障权利而导致的巨大财政赤字,这会侵蚀其在世界上继续扮演重要角色的能力。我们将看到这对国防预算的影响,尽管削减国防预算对减少赤字的作用微乎其微,但因为政治上的便利却不得不这么做。那些怀疑这些削减的影响的人们,只需要看看亚洲。美国已经宣布一项战略性“重新定位”,但是这能否真正给那些感受到中国威胁的国家再次提供安全承诺,仍有待观察。
  事实上,我书中的要点在于分析:如果美国被证明无法继续主导世界而沦为与其他大国(比如中国)那样相当的力量,那世界将可能会发生什么。我认为比较乐观的观点就是相信,在这种情形下,中国将只能在经济方面对美国构成挑战。一个新的多极化世界将是影响深远的。
  我有时候想,我们已经忘记了当一个国家力量不断增加时会如何作为。我们已经在一国远比其他国家力量强大得多的单极世界里生活了太久。美国霸权的存在迫使所有其他力量实施不寻常的克制,制止了正常的野心,避免各种行动以防止形成美国领导的那种曾两次击败德国、一次击败日本以及在冷战中较为和平地击败苏联的联盟。
  拥有良好的历史感的中国人已经敏锐地意识到历史上那些国家的命运,并努力地避免相似的命运,尽可能遵守着邓小平“韬光养晦”的建议。然而,随着相对力量的转变,邓小平的建议变得越来越难以遵循。在南中国海,我们看到了一些随着自信的增加中国将可能采取行动的早期征兆。不过,随着美国作出反应,该地区的不利势头得到扭转,这可能已经使得中国人相信他们的行动为时过早。他们也许对太多广泛传播的“美国衰落说”过于相信了。
  不管美国在未来几年是否真的走向衰落,可以肯定的是中国的压力和试探还会回来。中国方面更大的相对力量,也许还会导致北京因为台湾缺乏靠近大陆的动作而变得越来越没耐心。在美国的力量正在衰退而中国正在崛起的情形下,台湾问题将变得失控。尽管任何一方都不想发生战争,但这种情况几乎会像教科书上关于战争是如何开始的实例一样。这就是为什么有些人把台湾称作“东方的萨拉热窝”( East Asia's Sarajevo
  如果唯一的问题是中国将成为在经济领域更加有影响的国家,而美国依旧主导其他领域,那么世界就依旧会是可控的。我并不介意中国是否会购买洛克菲勒中心。我希望他们像日本在1989年那样取得好业绩。危险的是美国将在所有领域里都相对于中国发生衰落。那将会为美国自二战以来所支持和受益的国际秩序画上一个句号。然而,我依旧乐观地看到,美国和过去一样坦言它的问题,中国也会像过去一样发现前进的路上充满坎坷。与此同时,重要的是美国要努力挽救其世界领袖的位置,而不是听天由命地走向衰落,使之成为一个自我实现的预言
  德雷泽:谢谢两位的回应。在此我特别声明,我在主持两位的交流时是一个整合者,而不是分化者。
如果我们后退一步就会发现,类似的争论往往围绕已知事件的未知项,而且对西方的评论员们来说,未知项是中国及其邻国,而非美国。包括我在内的国际关系理论家也看到了关于未来的一些基本问题。对于拥有巨大市场规模、但是却在人均水平上相对更穷的中国,在面对美国时将会更多地关注绝对收益还是相对收益?中国的远近邻居们将牵制住一个崛起的力量,或者在一个利益共同体之中相互依赖?中国将从其2009年至2010年间好斗的外交政策导致的后果中吸取怎样的教训呢?
  我期待着在未来的几年里听到你们对于这些问题的回答。

FPI Director Robert Kagan debates Gideon Rachman on if America is in decline.

Dan Drezner:
Dear Bob and Gideon,
It's an honor to be moderating this discussion between the two of you. You have both managed to author interesting and cogently argued books that are nevertheless at odds with each other on the future of world order. Gideon, you are of the belief that the Age of Anxiety is upon us, due in no small part to the waning of American power and the Western model of political economy more generally. Bob, you rebut arguments about American decline by pointing out the ways in which current commentators have wildly exaggerated American power in the past and the ways in which current U.S. power resources are still quite robust.
Where you both seem to agree is on the necessity of American power to ensure global order and prosperity. Gideon, you asserted in Zero-Sum Future that "a strong, successful, and confident America remains the best hope for a stable and prosperous world." Bob, in the excerpt of The World America Madethat appeared in the New Republic, you conclude, "If American power declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by some other kind of order, reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers." On this dimension, you two are kindred spirits and at odds with people like John Ikenberry, who argues in Liberal Leviathan that rising powers will embrace the liberal order created by the United States and its allies more than 60 years ago.
To get the ball rolling, let me start with a few queries for Gideon. Your book came out before the Arab Spring, the U.S. "pivot" to the Pacific Rim, the new and exciting phase of the euro crisis, and hints that China's growth is slowing down. Do any of these events prompt a rethink on your part? If not, do Bob's assertions of continued American primacy ease your anxiety at all? Finally, according to FPThe World America Made has found a very influential audience: Barack Obama is apparently a fan. To go Barbara Walters on you, if there were one world leader you'd want to have read Zero-Sum World, who would it be and why?
Cheers,
Dan
Gideon Rachman:
Dear Dan,
You are right that Bob and I agree on the importance of American power for the stability and prosperity of the world. Where we differ is that I believe that we are witnessing a serious erosion of U.S. power. This is part of a broader phenomenon: A world dominated by the West is giving way to a new order in which economic and political power is much more contested.
You pose some excellent questions about how events since I completed the book, at the beginning of 2010, have affected my argument. Before I address them directly, I should briefly explain what I mean by an "Age of Anxiety."
My book argues that globalization was not just an economic phenomenon. It was also the central geopolitical development of the 30 years before the financial crisis. It created a web of common interests between the world's major powers, replacing the divided world of the Cold War with a single world order in which all the big powers were bound into a common capitalist system. If you had gone to Davos during this period, you would have found the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, the European Union, and the United States saying very similar things about the need to encourage world trade, foreign investment, and so on. They shared important assumptions about how the world should be run.
I describe the period from 1991 to 2008 as an "Age of Optimism" because all the world's major powers had reason to be satisfied with the way the globalized world system was working for them. India's reforms began in 1991 and led to an economic boom and a palpable surge in national confidence. The European Union more than doubled in size by incorporating the old Soviet bloc. Latin America had its debt crises, but by the end of the period, Brazil was being taken seriously as a global power for the first time in its history. For all their post-Soviet nostalgia, even the leaders of the new Russia were enthusiastic participants in a globalized world.
Most importantly, 1991-2008 was an Age of Optimism for both China and the United States. During this period, China's economy grew so rapidly that it was doubling in size every eight years or so. Chinese people could see their country and their families becoming visibly more prosperous. Still, the United States was the sole superpower. The growth of Silicon Valley and the rise of Google, Apple, et al. reaffirmed American confidence in the unique creative powers of U.S. capitalism. American political and economic ideas set the terms of the global debate. Indeed, the terms "globalization" and "Americanization" almost seemed synonymous.
This American confidence was very important to the world system. It allowed the United States to embrace a development that, in other circumstances, might have seemed threatening: the rise of China. In the Age of Optimism, successive U.S. presidents welcomed China's economic development. The argument they made was that capitalism would act as a Trojan horse, transforming the Chinese system from within. If China embraced economic freedom, political freedom would surely follow. But if China failed to embrace capitalism, it would fail economically.
In 2008, there was indeed a massive economic and financial crisis, but it came in the West, not in China. This unexpected development has accelerated a trend that was already in place: a shift in economic power from West to East and, within that, from the United States to China. Since then, it has become much harder to argue that globalization has created a win-win world. Instead, Americans are beginning to wonder, with good reason, whether a richer and more powerful China might mean a relatively poorer, relatively weaker United States. That is why I called my book Zero-Sum Future.
Now, I know that Bob disputes the idea that there has been a shift in economic power. He says the U.S. share of the world economy has stayed roughly steady at 25 percent. But that is not how I read the figures. The Economist (my old employer) now projects that China will be the world's largest economy, in real terms, by 2018. Writing in Feb. 9's Financial Times, Jeffrey Sachs puts it well:
In 1980, the US share of world income (measured in purchasing power parity prices) was 24.6 per cent. In 2011, it was 19.1 per cent. The IMF projects that it will decline to 17.6 per cent as of 2016.
China, by contrast, was a mere 2.2 per cent of world income in 1980, rising to 14.4 per cent in 2011, and projected by the IMF to overtake the US by 2016, with 18 per cent.
If this isn't a world-altering shift, it's hard to imagine what would be.
I know battles of rival statistics can be mind-numbing, so let me just add that my experiences reporting around the world strongly re-enforce this impression of growing Chinese influence based on surging economic strength. In Brazil, I was told that President Dilma Rousseff was paying her first state visit to Beijing, not Washington, because China -- her country's largest trading partner -- is now more important to Brazil. In Brussels, they talk hopefully of China, not America, writing a large check to alleviate the euro crisis. And, of course, China looms ever larger over the rest of Asia.
This shift in economic and political power has important implications for the world order. A weaker United States is less willing and able to play a leading role in sorting out the world's economic and political crises. There will be no Marshall Plan for Europe. There will not even be an American-led "committee to save the world" as there was during the Asian and Russian crises. And when it comes to the turmoil in the Middle East, the United States was more than happy to "lead from behind" on Libya. Meanwhile, the United States has pulled out of Iraq and is pulling back from Afghanistan. Don't get me wrong. I think it's perfectly sensible for Obama to try to reduce U.S. military commitments around the world, especially given the grim budgetary outlook. But we are unmistakably in a new era. No U.S. president can now say the country will "bear any burden" to secure its goals.
Let me now deal with the questions that you raise. The early stages of the euro crisis feature in my book. Its later stages further strengthen my argument. The European Union is a classic example of an organization built around a "win-win" economic logic. The idea of the EU's founding fathers was that economic cooperation and shared prosperity would create a positive political dynamic. And for 50 years it worked beautifully. But that win-win logic has gone into reverse. Instead of feeling stronger together, EU countries increasingly worry they are pulling each other down. The result is a surge in political tensions inside Europe and, in particular, an outbreak of anti-German sentiment. This has global implications; for one, America's pivot to Asia is posited on the idea that Europe will no longer require attention -- a premise I somehow doubt.
As for the U.S. pivot to Asia, I think it's a predictable and rational response to rising Chinese power. But I'm not sure it will work. America's allies in the region face an interesting dilemma. Japan, India, Australia, and South Korea have their most important trading relationship with China -- and their most important strategic relationship with the United States. Unless China grossly overplays its hand and terrifies its neighbors, over time those economic ties will weigh more heavily than the military relationship with the United States. As a result, China's influence in Asia will steadily increase -- at the expense of the United States.
All this, of course, is posited on the continuing growth of the Chinese economy. So what about those "hints that China's economic growth is slowing down"? I wouldn't be at all surprised. Indeed, I would go further and suggest that both the Chinese economy and the Chinese political system are unstable and crisis-prone. If a crisis hits, plenty of people in the United States and elsewhere will eagerly proclaim that the rise of China was a mirage. They will be wrong. This is a long-term process of huge historical significance, comparable with the rise of the United States in the 19th century. U.S. history should tell you that it is perfectly possible to combine political turmoil with the rise of a dynamic, continental economy. After all, America fought a civil war and still emerged as "No. 1" by the early 20th century.
Finally, you ask about the Arab Spring. It could point in two very different directions. If the Arab world successfully embraces democracy and economic freedom, that will reassert the hopeful narrative of the Age of Optimism, in which democracy and economic freedom are spreading around the world and building an increasingly cooperative, liberal, international order (John Ikenberry's world, if you like). Over the very long term, I am still hopeful this is how the Arab Spring will pan out. Over the next decade, however, it seems to me more likely that the Arab Spring will play into the darker narrative of an Age of Anxiety, which is characterized by failed states, cross-border conflict, the rise of illiberal and anti-Western ideologies, and mass migration by displaced people.
As for my dream reader, I don't think I will be able to trump Obama. But if I'm honest, my book is stronger on description than prescription. The phrase "zero-sum future" is meant as a portrayal of a likely destination, rather than a recommendation. In fact, a willing embrace of zero-sum logic would be dangerous. The broad response I recommend involves concentrating on rebuilding U.S. domestic economic strength and attempting to defend the principles of a liberal world order, while hedging against the rise of authoritarian world powers. Broadly speaking, I think that is the policy of the Obama administration.
So rather than nominating an ideal reader, let me finish by telling you about an actual reader. I recently met a European commissioner who is right at the center of the euro crisis. He told me he had read my book and found it interesting -- before adding, "My job is to prove you wrong." Given the gravity of the crisis facing Europe and the West, I hope he succeeds.
Drezner:
Dear Gideon and Bob,
Thanks for your response, Gideon!
To move the ball into Bob's court, a few queries. In his response, Gideon suggests your data on the persistence of American power are somewhat off. He's not the only one; Robert Pape made points like this a few years ago in the National Interest, and Edward Luce has made similar points this week in theFinancial Times. Without going too far down the rabbit hole of data, alternative data series can probably be arranged that show a more secular U.S. decline since the 1960s. How crucial is this data question to your overall argument? More generally, what about going forward? Gideon's point about China is well-taken; even if it does suffer a growth slowdown, would that necessarily slow down its eventual rise? The United States suffered some serious depressions during the late 19th century and still became the world's leading industrial power.
Gideon's response highlights another brewing problem with American primacy: Even if the United States is not declining, its long-standing allies are in serious trouble. America's NATO allies are entangled in a sovereign debt crisis, and Japan has its own demographic issues. There are other allies, but as Gideon notes, they have become highly interdependent with China. There are rising states that might share American values -- Brazil and India, for instance -- but it's far from clear whether their alignments with the United States will be anything more than tactical. Without supporters, can the United States still lead?
Finally, we know Obama has read the New Republic excerpt of your book. Has Mitt Romney? I'm curious because a) you're a foreign-policy advisor for him, and b) the Republican presidential candidate's rhetoric on this point -- that Obama believes in American decline, while he believes this will be an American century -- seems at odds with Obama's embrace of your argument.
Cheers,
Dan
Robert Kagan:
Dear Dan and Gideon,
Many thanks to you both for this lively and important discussion. I'm glad Obama mentioned the excerpt from my book, not only for the obvious reasons, but also because he has kicked off a genuinely useful debate about the relative position of the United States and other powers in the international system. We seem to have slipped into a "post-American world" a couple of years ago without much rigorous analysis of whether that was really a good description of the international system. I believe it is not.
First, those GDP figures. My argument that the U.S. share has held fairly steady with roughly a quarter of world GDP since 1969 rests on the U.S. government's figures, which can be found here.
Anyone who takes the trouble to look into this question quickly discovers that, of course, the numbers are a bit all over the place. The IMF's own numbers are constantly changing, even in regard to the past. For instance, as I wrote in response to Luce and Sachs, according to the IMF's 2010 World Economic Outlook report, the U.S. share of world GDP based on purchasing power parity in 1980 was 22.499 percent. In 2007, the last year before the Great Recession, the U.S. share was 21.289 -- not much of a shift. In its 2011 report, however, the IMF put the share in 1980 at 24.6, making the shift seem greater. Which is right? As for the IMF's projections, can we wait and see how they turn out before building an entire global theory around them? They are constantly revising those up and down, too, and things may look different when the United States pulls out of its recession.
But how much weight should we put on this statistic in any case? Some, surely. There is no question that as China's share of the global economy grows, Chinese influence will grow in some respects as well. But I find it remarkable that in so many of these discussions, those who point to China's growing GDP share neglect to mention that China's per capita GDP is a fraction of that of the United States and other leading economic powers. Per capita GDP in the United States is over $40,000; in China it is a little over $4,000, roughly the same level as in Angola and Belize. Even if optimistic forecasts are correct, by 2030 China's per capita GDP will still be only half that of the United States, roughly where Slovenia's is today. It is interesting to contemplate what this might mean if China were to become economically dominant, because it is historically unprecedented; in the past, the world's dominant powers have also been the world's richest.
As a matter of geopolitics and power, the size of a country's economy by itself is not a great measure. If it were, then China would have been the world's strongest power in 1800, when it had the largest share of global GDP. So the next question is whether China can translate its economic power into geopolitical influence. Again, it will undoubtedly do so to some extent. But power and influence do not stem from economic strength alone, and China is already the best proof of this. Over the past couple of years, as the U.S. economy has been slumping and China's has been booming, the United States has significantly improved its standing in East Asia and Southeast Asia, while China's position has deteriorated. In fact, the more China uses its newfound muscle, the more it sparks a reaction in the region, which then looks to the United States for succor. (This was the key insight of William Wohlforth years ago in his brilliant essay, "The Stability of a Unipolar World.") Gideon keeps predicting that Japan is about to tilt toward China, but all signs point in the opposite direction -- and not only for Japan but also for most of China's other neighbors. The fact that China is the top trading partner of all these countries does not necessarily increase China's clout. I gather that even Brazilians are increasingly unhappy at becoming merely a raw materials provider to the Chinese. No economy in the world is more dependent on China than Australia's, but look at the new U.S. base the Australians just welcomed onto their soil. Trade does not necessarily breed comity or strategic dependence. As many have pointed out, in 1914 Germany and Britain were each other's largest trading partners too.
China, in fact, has significant obstacles to overcome before it can become a global power on a par with the United States -- above all, the fears and suspicions of neighbors who are themselves pretty powerful and, in the case of India, rising almost as fast as China. It is a cliché, but the United States really was blessed with a favorable geographic situation. It has no great powers in its hemisphere and faces no direct threat from any of its neighbors. China is surrounded by past and future adversaries. Even the Soviet Union was in better shape during the Cold War.
This in part answers Dan's question about the state of America's allies. That India and Brazil may not move in lock step with the United States is not all that important. U.S. influence does not derive from being able to tell everyone what to do all the time; it never could, even in Europe at the height of the Cold War. Rather, it is the overall balance of influence in the world that helps determine America's position. In a future where the United States and China are likely to be competitors, a powerful India strengthens the American hand no matter how friendly New Delhi and Washington may be.
As to Europe, let's take a broader perspective, please. Compared with the devastated Europe that the United States inherited as an ally in 1945, today's Europe, even with its economic crisis, is a mega-superpower and a very fine ally to have, indeed.
Rachman:
Dear Bob,
I agree with you on one important point. Political power and economic weight are different things. That is why -- even if China becomes the world's largest economy around 2018 -- the United States will continue to be the world's dominant political power for a while. America's network of alliances, military strength, technological prowess, "soft power," political stability, and geographic position are all assets China lacks.
That said, even though political power and economic size are not the same thing, they surely are closely related. So as China becomes wealthier, its geopolitical power grows and becomes much more of a challenge to America's. China's growing wealth gives it more money to spend on assets abroad, foreign aid, and its military. Above all, the lure of Chinese investment and the Chinese market become a powerful tool to shape the behavior of other countries. You can see this with Europe right now. China's ability to supply credit and juicy contracts is making Europeans significantly less willing to confront China, whether on human rights or the environment.
That is why I find your point about GDP per capita less than reassuring. Yes, it is true that the average American will be richer than the average Chinese for decades to come -- perhaps forever. But Luxembourg's GDP per capita is already considerably higher than that of both China and the United States. This does not matter geopolitically because there are so few people in Luxembourg.
To a great extent, this is about simple arithmetic. Japan was never going to be "No. 1" because its population is less than half that of the United States. China is almost certain to be No. 1 in economic terms because its population is four times that of the United States. You are right that the relative poverty of the average Chinese citizen will make China an unfamiliar sort of superpower -- simultaneously richer and poorer than us. This could make China relatively introverted, or it could make it more aggressive as it seeks resources to fuel its rise and satisfy the aspirations of its population. For me, the biggest question mark over China's rise is whether the coming of democracy (if it arrives) will provoke the country's breakup, especially as separatist movements gain momentum in Tibet and Xinjiang. But even though these areas represent a big chunk of Chinese territory, they account for only about 2 percent of the population.
Furthermore, it is not just China that faces troubling questions. You are right to point out America's enduring strengths. But the rapid growth of the U.S. national debt raises the prospect of a really nasty fiscal crunch. When it comes to sovereign debt, we in Europe have just discovered the truth of that old economists' joke that "things that can't go on forever, don't." The United States cannot continue running up debts at its current rate. And even a controlled, rational effort to manage the debt will have serious implications for U.S. spending -- and deployable power.
I agree that the balance of power between the United States and China will depend to a huge extent on the choices made by other countries. You are right that I was probably overimpressed by the Japanese tilt to China under Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. That proved to be transient. Nonetheless, it was an interesting episode because it underlined a central point about the emerging world order. As China grows more powerful, the United States cannot assume that traditional allies or fellow democracies will cleave to America. In the last U.S. presidential election, the candidates did a lot to promote the idea of a "league of democracies." But in the intervening four years, we have seen that democracies do not always stick together. At the climate change talks in Copenhagen, Brazil, India, and South Africa were on China's side, not America's -- their identity as developing countries trumped their identity as democracies. The same countries condemned the recent NATO-led intervention in Libya as it developed into a real military campaign. Their suspicion of Western intentions trumped their support for human rights.
In the battle for hearts and minds around the world, America's identity as the world's leading democracy will be a big asset. But China's ability to capitalize on widespread resentment of centuries of Western domination should not be underestimated.
America is still way ahead when it comes to hard military power. But I think it is unlikely that China and America will ever go to war. It is economic strength -- not military power or "soft" power -- that will matter most in the contest between the United States and China. And the moment when China pulls ahead of America in economic terms is, I'm afraid, approaching rapidly.
Kagan:
Dear Gideon,
I'm afraid we have landed on a wide swath of common ground. We both agree that the United States will remain the predominant global power and enjoys distinct advantages over China "for a while." We both agree, as well, that China may present a formidable challenge in the years to come, one that may tax American capabilities and American wisdom. The United States faces serious problems at home -- not least the enormous fiscal deficits driven by entitlements -- that erode its ability to continue playing its vital role in the world. We are already seeing the effects on the defense budget, which, despite the fact that defense cuts will make scarcely a dent in the deficit, is being sacrificed to political expediency. Those who doubt the effects of these cuts need only look to Asia. The administration has announced a strategic "pivot," but whether it will be able to make good on its renewed pledge to provide security to those feeling threatened by China remains to be seen.
The main point of my book, in fact, is to examine what might happen in the world should the United States prove incapable of continuing as the predominant power and slip into a rough equality with other powers, like China. I'm afraid it is optimistic to believe that China will pose only an economic challenge to the United States under those circumstances. The effects of a new multipolar world will be far-reaching. I sometimes think we have forgotten how countries behave as their power increases. We have been living so long in a world where one power has been so much more powerful than all the others. The existence of the American hegemon has forced all other powers to exercise unusual restraint, curb normal ambitions, and avoid actions that might lead to the formation of a U.S.-led coalition of the kind that defeated Germany twice, Japan once, and the Soviet Union, more peacefully, in the Cold War.
The Chinese, as good historians, are acutely aware of the fate that befell these others and have worked hard to avoid a similar fate, following as best they can Deng Xiaoping's advice to "keep a low profile and never take the lead." As relative power shifts, however, that advice becomes harder and harder to follow. We saw some early signs of what the future might hold in China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. The response of the United States, which swung in behind the nervous powers in the region, has possibly convinced the Chinese that their moves were premature. They may have themselves bought in too much to the widespread talk of America in decline. Were that decline to become real in the coming years, however, it is a certainty that Chinese pressures and probes will return. Greater relative power on China's part might also lead Beijing to become less patient with Taiwan's lack of movement toward acquiescing to the mainland's sovereignty. A situation in which U.S. power were declining, China's power were rising, and the Taiwan issue became fractious is practically a textbook instance of how wars start -- even if neither side wants war. That is why some have referred to Taiwan as East Asia's Sarajevo.
If our only problem were that China was going to become more influential in the economic realm, while the United States retained dominance in all other realms, this might be manageable. I don't mind if the Chinese buy Rockefeller Center. I hope they get as good a deal as the Japanese did in 1989. The danger is that the United States may decline relative to China on all measures of power. That would spell the end of the international order the United States has supported and benefited from since the end of World War II.
I remain optimistic, however, that the United States will address its problems, as it has in the past, and that China will discover bumps in the road ahead, as it has in the past. In the meantime, it is important that the United States work to preserve its leading position in the world and not succumb to a declinism that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Drezner:
Dear Gideon and Bob,
Thanks for your responses. I hereby declare myself to be a uniter rather than a divider when it comes to moderating exchanges, thereby guaranteeing that The Powers That Be at FP will never ask me to do anything like this ever again.
If we step back, debates like these often tend to revolve around what the known unknowns are, and for Western commentators, what's unknown is China and its neighbors, rather than the United States. The international relations theorist in me also sees some irreducible questions about the future. Will a China that possesses a huge market size but is comparatively poorer per capita care more about absolute gains or relative gains vis-à-vis the United States? Will China's close and distant neighbors balance against a rising power or be trapped by interdependence into a more accommodating posture? What lessons will China draw from the aftermath of its more bellicose foreign policy turn in 2009 and 2010?
I look forward to hearing your answers to these questions in the ensuing years.


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