作者：扎卡里·卡拉贝尔 （Zachary Karabell）2009年10月12日 华尔街日报
The dollar's sharp drop over the past few weeks has led to considerable anxiety about the status of the United States as the dominant force in the global economy. Closely related to this fear is constant worry about the rise of China and the evermore complicated relationship between Beijing and Washington.
Most people are now aware that China is the largest creditor to a heavily indebted U.S. government. It holds close to a trillion dollars of U.S. Treasurys and has invested hundreds of billions more in private enterprises in America. Even though these facts are plainly acknowledged, policy makers and experts continue to underestimate the full ramifications of this relationship.Consider what happened in 1946, when a cash-strapped Great Britain turned to the U.S. for a loan. For 30 years or more, the British had been consumed by the threat of a rising Germany. Two wars had been fought, millions of lives had been lost, and the British treasury was dramatically depleted in the process. Britain survived, but the costs were substantial.
In spite of its global empire, a powerful military, and an enviable position at the center of world-wide commerce, in early 1946 the British government faced a serious risk of defaulting on its financial obligations. So it did what it had done at various points over the previous decade and turned to its closest ally for assistance. It asked the U.S. for a loan of $5 billion at zero-interest repayable over 50 years. As generous as those terms seem today, such financing had been almost routine in years prior. To the surprise and shock of the British, Washington refused.
Unable to take no for answer, Britain explained that unless it received funds the government would be insolvent. The Americans came back with a series of conditions. They would lend Britain $3.7 billion at 2% interest, and the British government would have to abide by the 1944 Bretton Woods plan, which made the dollar rather than the pound sterling the reference point for global exchange rates and required Britain to make the pound freely convertible. Even more significantly, Britain had to end its system of imperial preferences, which meant no more tariffs and duties on goods to and from colonies such as India. These were not mere financial penalties: Taken together, they meant the end of the British Empire.
Within two years, Britain had left India and was on its way to decolonizing throughout Asia and Africa. Unable to compete with the United States economically and no longer able to reap the benefits of colonial trade, Britain's military shrank and its commerce contracted. It quickly receded from its dominant global position and entered several decades of economic malaise. In the 1980s, Britain finally emerged as a prosperous country, but it was a shadow of what it had been in its heyday.
The U.S. replaced Britain as the guardian of the West. As one British official, Evelyn Shuckburgh, remarked in the late 1940s, "it was impossible not to be conscious that we were playing second fiddle." And that was precisely what the U.S. desired. Having supported the British for decades and become its banker and manufacturer during two wars, at the end of World War II the U.S. fully intended to supplant the British Empire. The loan request provided the pretext, but by then the balance had already shifted and Britain could have done little to reverse the tide.
By 2030—if not sooner—China is likely to surpass the U.S. in the size of its economy, though it will remain on a per capita basis a much poorer society for many years after that. Trajectories can change, but the recent implosion of the American financial system has only accelerated China's rise.
Given the lesson of the British Empire's demise, it would be foolish to base current policy on the assumption that China will hit a fatal speed-bump before it is able to supplant the U.S. And while the level of current indebtedness is manageable for the U.S.—and in fact tethers the Chinese closely to the U.S. economy in ways that are arguably beneficial for both countries—the fact that these economies are currently bound together does not mean that their interests will always be in sync.
Here, too, the British analogy is sobering. For decades, the relationship between Britain and the U.S. was mutually beneficial, though the Americans resented being treated as junior partners. As tension festered, the British were consumed with the more immediate threat of Germany. But in the end it was the U.S. that delivered the knockout blow.
The Americans have not had to deal with a true economic rival since the British more than half a century ago. America today is as unaccustomed to global economic competition as the British were at their apex. The U.S. often seems lumbering and ill-suited to the demands of economic rivalry.
The only way to avoid Britain's fate and meet the challenge of China is to reinvigorate economic life. This is a multiyear endeavor that must be done primarily through innovation, not legislation. America needs to retool its domestic economy to build on the global success of many U.S. companies. It must focus on inventing new products and generating new ideas, rather than defending the rusty industries of yesterday. Fights over health care and climate change are the cultural equivalent of fiddling while Rome burns.
China thrives because it is hungry, dynamic, scared of failure and convinced that it should be a leading force in the world. That is why America thrived a century ago. Today, such hunger and dynamism seem less evident in American life than petulance that the world is not cooperating.
The U.S. is in danger of assuming that because it has been a dominant nation on the world stage, it must continue to be so. That is a recipe for becoming Britain.
Mr. Karabell is the author of "Superfusion: How China and America Became One Economy and Why the World's Prosperity Depends on It," just published by Simon & Schuster.
美国赤字与中国挑战
美元过去几周里的大幅下挫令人对美国作为全球经济主导力量的地位倍感焦虑。与这种恐慌密切相关的是对中国崛起及中美两国关系日益复杂的担忧。
现在，许多人都认识到，中国是债台高筑的美国政府最大的债权人。它持有近1万亿美元的美国国债，并向美国私营企业投资了数千亿美元。即使人们普遍认识到了这些事实，但决策者和专家仍继续低估了这种关系的广泛影响。
看看1946年发生的情况吧，当时资金短缺的英国向美国寻求贷款。在30多年的时间里，英国一直被德国崛起的威胁所消耗。经过了两场世界大战和失去的数百万条生命，英国的国库在这个过程中也几乎消耗一空。英国幸存了下来，但却付出了巨大的代价。
尽管这个世界强国拥有强大的军队以及令人艳羡的全球商业中心的地位，但在1946年初，英国政府却在其金融负债方面面临严重的违约风险。因此它像此前10年里所做的一切一样，转向最亲密的盟友寻求援助。它要求美国提供50亿美元50年内偿还的无息贷款。尽管这些条款今天看来非常慷慨，但这种融资在当年几乎属于惯例。不过令人感到惊讶和震惊的是，美国拒绝了这个要求。
无法接受拒绝的答复，英国方面解释说，除非它获得资金，否则政府将会破产。美国则提出一系列条件。它们愿以2%的利率提供37亿美元贷款，英国政府需要遵守1944年的布雷顿森林体系计划，即让美元，而不是英镑成为全球汇率的基准，并要求英国实现英镑的自由兑换。更重要的是，英国需要结束其帝国优惠制，这意味著进出印度等殖民地的商品将没有更高的关税等征税。这些已不是单纯的金融处罚：所有这些措施将意味著大英帝国的终结。
两年之内，英国离开了印度，并逐步在整个亚洲和非洲结束了殖民统治。由于无法在经济上与美国竞争，也不能再从殖民地的贸易中受益，英国军力下降，商业萎缩。它从全球强国的地位迅速下滑，陷入了几十年的经济困境。到20世纪80年代，英国终于成为一个繁荣的国家，但与其鼎盛时期已不可同日而语。
美国取代英国成为了西方的代言人。正如英国官员沙克伯勒(Evelyn Shuckburgh)在40年代末时所说的，我们不可能不认识到已经成为了次要角色。而这正是美国所希望的。几十年来美国一直在支持英国，在两次世界大战期间成为了英国的银行家和制造商，到了二战结束时，美国希望完全取代大英帝国了。贷款上的要求提供了一个借口，但当时实力的天平已经倾斜，英国已经无力扭转这种趋势了。
最迟，中国的经济规模可能会在2030年能超过美国，尽管在此后的许多年里，中国在人均基础上依然会是一个更为贫穷的国家。轨迹可能会改变，但美国金融系统最近的危机只会加快中国的崛起。
鉴于大英帝国消亡的教训，将目前的政策建立在中国将在取代美国前遭遇重大困难的假设上是愚蠢的做法。尽管美国目前的债务水平仍在可控范围内，事实上把中国与美国经济以一种在有些人看来对双方都有利的方式联系到了一起，但这并不意味著他们的利益永远是同步的。
在这方面，与英国的比较也是清醒恰当的。几十年来，英国与美国保持著互惠互利的关系，尽管美国人不满被当作小弟弟看待。随著战前紧张局势的蔓延，英国人被迫应付德国这个更直接的威胁，但最终是美国给了英国最致命的一击。
除了半个多世纪以前的英国，美国还没有遇到过真正的经济对手。如今的美国同处于顶峰时期的英国一样不习惯于全球经济竞争。美国看来常常对经济竞争的要求反应迟缓和准备不足。
美国要想避免重蹈英国覆辙、迎接中国挑战的唯一办法是重振经济活力。这是一个需要付出多年的努力，必须主要是通过创新而不是立法加以解决。美国需要依赖于许多公司在全球的成功重组其国内经济。它必须把重点放在新产品的发明和新思想的建立上，而不是捍卫以前的陈旧的产业。在医疗卫生和气候变化问题上争执不休无疑是分不清轻重缓急。
中国的蓬勃发展是因为它充满渴望和活力、害怕失败，并相信它应该成为世界上的主导力量。这也是美国在一个世纪前壮大的原因。今天，美国人身上的这种渴望和活力看上去弱于他们对世界不与其合作而产生的急躁感。
美国的危险在于，只是因为它曾是世界舞台上的主要国家，它就认为自己必须继续如此。这会重蹈英国的覆辙。
